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Abstract
The fundamental purpose of my thesis is to consider the ongoing formation of European identity
within the context of the contemporary refugee/migrant crisis in Europe. In doing so, I will
briefly survey how a European identity has been conceived and constructed through legal
documents, treaties, and political speeches. Moreover, I will use different theories such as
Anderson’s imagined communities to consider whether European identity is post-modern and
post-national as it is sometimes celebrated to be. The EU is frequently regarded as a unique
experiment in history and the first real post-modern political entity. However, looking deeper
into the identity construction process, it does not seem to reflect a post-national construction but
rather an identity often constructed on national and primordial resources, making the EU more
supranational than a post-national entity. This is particularly true in relation to the refugee crisis
which has been framed as a threat to European identity and culture. The role of borders, the
Mediterranean Sea, and fortress Europe are critical terms I will analyze to consider the refugee
crisis case study. Refugees have become the “other” or the “enemy” in contrast to the
“Europeans.” Migrants are seen as a threat to one’s culture and identity, but if the European
identity is still evolving and not clearly defined, how can migrants pose a threat to it? The
migrant crisis provides the context that clearly demonstrates the contradictions and paradox
inside the idea of a European identity.
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1. Introduction
One of the most recurrent questions throughout my thesis is to understand if a
European identity can be described as post-national and postmodern or if its construction is
similar to the nation-states, making it a supranational form of identity. In the last few years, the
question of identity has become more pressing for policymakers and politicians in Europe. The
majority of individuals have a strong national identity, considered exclusive and unique;
however, as we know, individuals can enjoy multiple identities without any necessary
contradictions between them. The European identity question is more ambiguous because it goes
beyond national identification, and it presumably coexists with different local, regional, and
supranational identities. After the World Wars, Europe developed two main ideas for political
integration for the EU. One conceived of a European political entity as a federation similar to the
United States of America. The other has focused on a balance of power and identities
cooperating within the same political entity, a sort of "confederation option" we can say.
There have been a series of initiatives to promote a European identity, and I will briefly
analyze them in my literature review. In 1973, the Nine Members of the EC decided to draft a
document specifically focused on European identity with the precise objective of building a
stronger united Europe. The Maastricht Treaty (1991) shaped for the first time the idea of
European citizenship, giving Europeans a sense of exclusiveness and belonging to something
unique. The treaty also highlights the importance of education, culture, youth, and legal powers
in citizens' everyday life, assuming that symbols play a vital role in constructing a common
identity in Europe. Ironically, these symbols' creation is very similar to a nationalistic way of
creating an identity, resembling the nation states' propaganda campaigns during the 19th century.
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For this reason, one of the most recurrent questions throughout my thesis is whether a European
identity can be described as post-national and postmodern, or if its construction is similar to the
nation-states, making it a supranational form of identity.
Author Stefan Höjelid in his essay “European Integration and the idea of European
Identity: Obstacles and Possibilities” divides the literature into two specific categories. Scholars
with a pessimistic view, usually nationalists, and scholars with optimistic views toward the
integration process in Europe. 1According to nationalists such as Antony Smith, the nation is the
only criteria to analyze a form of identity. A modern society needs a certain level of loyalty and
solidarity, and this is only possible when there is a nation with a national identity. National
identity remains thus the most important form of identification.
Nevertheless, going back to the discourse of multiple identities, individuals can have
more than one identity, making European identity possible. This is the main argument for my
thesis; a European identity is possible. It exists on an individual level; however, it falls into an
ambiguous category since it encompasses 27 different countries with their own cultures and
languages. Some educational programs such as Erasmus and Euro-festivals have been partially
successful in unifying European citizens, and Eurobarometer surveys show an attachment to
Europe amongst a significant population.
Questions of identity are inextricably related to migration issues because crises such as
the refugee one, have made the question of finding a common European identity more pressing
and urgent. With the arrival of masses of refugees on European soil, the EU was caught by
surprise, incapable of finding and adopting a common policy demonstrating a level of solidarity
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with all member states. The years 2015/2016 are considered the peak of the emergency and the
beginning of a European crisis characterized by a deep political instability from the member
states. The first response of the EU was a standard agreement in sharing the responsibilities of
refugees among member states. The response was a failure both in registering refugees entering
the countries and sharing responsibilities for them between nation-states. In the absence of a firm
EU policy, governments took national measures to close and tighten borders, often violating the
Schengen agreements and laws in Europe. Legal and administrative responsibilities were put in
the hands of countries located in southern Europe and the Mediterranean, already financially and
economically unstable, to deal with the significant inflow of migrants and refugees. The
consequence was the resurgence of populist, nationalist and right-wing parties all around Europe.
Despite praising itself for its borderless policy and free mobility, Europe has become a
fortress with a strong reintroduction of borders to avoid immigrants moving from one part of the
continent to another. European identity is then showing its exclusive character in which some
can enter fortress Europe, and some are inevitably excluded. From here, we can see the paradox
of the European identity, which praises itself for its inclusiveness toward different cultures while
excluding the migrant, seen as the enemy.

4
2. Literature Review
This thesis will investigate and analyze the dynamics of building and maintaining
European identity. I explore the ways it is different from a national identity, since it goes beyond
alliances between particular nation-states and presumes a supranational identity that is not
supposed to conflict with or contradict single individual national identities. The main question is
whether citizens can have two layers of political identity, their national one as well as a
European one. In order to do so, I analyze whether the EU builds its political identities on civic
and inclusive sources or if it engenders primordial and exclusive forms of identity construction.
The meaning and construction of a European identity will be explored within the context of the
European Migrant Crisis, considered one of the biggest challenges and threats to European
identity and culture.
Since the creation of a European integration process, the existence of a European identity
has been one of the most debated topics throughout Europe. Can a genuine European identity
exist and is it necessary to support the construction of a political entity like the EU? The idea of a
united Europe is not completely new but dates back in history to the Roman Empire; both
Napoleon and Charlemagne had ambitions to unify the majority of Europe. The European Union
is a very new kind of political entity, created in 1951 with the main idea of a “United States of
Europe” to avoid future conflicts after the tragedy of the World Wars. For instance, John Ruggie,
Professor and expert in international politics, defined the EU as the first post-modern polity.2
Scholars and politicians of the time such as Jürgen Habermas or Robert Schuman often seen the
EU as a successful experiment that was able to overcome the modern age characterized by an
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extremist form of nationalism. After the unification of Europe, one of the most pressing issues
has been the development of an identity that can accompany this political institution; more
specifically, a European identity that can coexist with the other national identities of every single
member state. The EU is currently formed by 27 different member states, each with their own
culture, languages, traditions, religions, and different ethnic communities, all united under the
same political institution and possible identity. Central to the European Commission has been the
development of two layers of political identity with a post-national form of European identity,
able to go beyond the Westphalian system. But another question that arises is whether the EU
can be considered as a post-modern nation which can coexist within the same territory of
existing nations, or is it replacing nationalism and national identities? My thesis addresses these
questions; nevertheless, there are no final answers and the process of defining a European
identity poses a series of problems.
Scholars are deeply divided when it comes to identity issues. Some of them, such as the
founding fathers of the EU, highlight the uniqueness together with the postmodern/post-national
character of the EU; while others, such as Antony Smith or Rainer Hüssle, are more reluctant in
considering the EU as a post-modern nation since a European identity seems more guided by
principles of exclusion of immigrants leading Europe to a more national form of identity or, to
better say, to a more supra-national identity rather than post-national.
The starting point to investigate the meaning and existence of a European identity is the
concept of collective or social identities. The majority of scholars agree that individuals can have
multiple identities in the contemporary world and these identities can either reinforce or diminish
a sense of attachment to national identity. Individuals can live with multiple identifications and
still enjoy each of them; however, some identities will inevitably be pressured by external
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circumstances. Individual identity is usually referred to as how individuals identify themselves
and are identified by others in different ways, depending on different situations with an element
of the distinctiveness of the individual. Collective identities, on the other side, go beyond
individuality and refer to a sense of belonging to a specific social group in which the identity of
the group becomes part of the individual identity, for instance, the sense of belonging to the same
nation-state. As author Klaus Eder affirms in his essay “A Theory of Collective Identity Making
Sense of the Debate on a European Identity”: “Collective identity has been at the center of
attention in societies that were formed in the course of the making of the nation-state. The nation,
however, has not been an exclusive focus. Collective identity can equally refer to cities, to
regions, or to groups such as political parties or even social movements. For some time,
collective identity has also been an issue with regard to Europe where public debate is
increasingly concerned with the problem of a European identity that is seen as lacking or as
necessary.”3
The typical elements of a national identity can be found in the importance of territory,
sharing the same myths and historical memories, a common culture and a system of legal rights
and institutions. British sociologist Anthony Smith in his essay “National Identity and the Idea of
European Unity”, defines a nation as: “a named human population sharing a historical territory,
common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common
economy, and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the
collectivity”4. Nationalisms start from the premises of exclusive identities to unify the national
and have a distinct individuality falling under this category. For this reason, Anthony Smith

3
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remains skeptical about whether a European identity can be constructed in the absence of a
common history, language, and ethnic bonds and many critics agree with him in affirming there
is no basis to a Europe as a cultural community due to the diversity of national culture and the
lack of a common language.
On the contrary, other authors agree on how collective identities are constantly
challenged and reconstructed rather than fixed and stable. The question that Smith is trying to
answer is whether Europe is the dream of political unity without nationalistic trappings or if it is
a simple repetition of a national identity formation on a larger scale. More specifically, is a
European identity and a political community possible when the nation-state has been assumed as
the only unit to support a legitimate government and political community? Or is a unified Europe
a sort of supernation? From one side, the European national identity can come into conflict with
the national ones, which often happened in foreign policy matters, for instance, with the
Yugoslav conflict. On another level, though, I agree with the idea that individuals are today more
prone to choose to which nation they belong to, and there are no evident contradictions between
these two types of identities.
In Thomas Risse’s book, A Community of Europeans?, collective identities are seen as
the link between the individuals and the social groups; therefore, this identity derives from the
sense of belonging to a specific social group together with the feeling of attachment and a sense
of obligation to it.5 The difference between the self and the other is fundamental, as in every type
of identity, but individuals do not always express identification to a single group, holding
multiple forms of identities depending on the specific situation they find themselves in.
Policymakers in Europe widely assume that national and European identities can coexist without
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any contrast and the same motto of the EU, “unity in diversity”, celebrates the diversity of the
EU as an advantage. A concrete example in Europe of this coexistence is the national flag
displayed with the European one in public buildings, schools, driver licenses, or even diplomas.
Primordial identities vs civic identities
According to German author Rainer Hüssle, in his essay “Imagine the EU: the
metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity”, there are three fundamental aspects
connected to identity: the fact that collective identities are social constructions, there is no
identity without difference, and there are two different types of collective identities, primordial
and civic.6 These basic assumptions are shared in most studies concerning European identity, but
there is often disagreement on the question whether European identity as more primordial or
civic. Collective identities are based upon features typical of the collectivity, such as a common
language, culture, ethnicity and traditions. As Hüssle says: “Collective identities constructed
according to the primordial type are based (more exactly: are imagined to be based) on some
inherent characteristics of the collectivity, for example, a common culture, language or
ethnicity.”7 They are imagined identities, based on a deep sense of belonging to a specific
territory united by ethnic bonds. Germany is usually considered as an example of primordial
identity even if, after World War II, civic elements were introduced in their current form of
identity.
On the other side, collective civic identities are not naturally given or imagined but the
result of social interaction between people and the sense of belonging to a political entity.
According to Hüssle: “Collective identity constructed according to the civic type, in contrast, is
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not imagined to be a natural given but it results from social interaction within a political entity.
Rather than identifying with a nation (defined through a common culture), people identify with a
state (Bruter 2005: 12).”8 This type of identity is a politically acquired identity rather than
naturally inherited, and France is often taken as an example of civic identity. A way to sum up
the difference is thinking of primordial identities as strictly connected to cultural sources of
identification and civic identities connected to political sources of identification.
Another distinction made by the author is the mode of differentiation, digital and analog.
He says “The second dimension of my identity-model focuses on the ‘mode of differentiation’
(Ruggie 1993: 168, emphasis added) between the self and other. I take up Iver Neumann’s
(1998) distinction between a ‘digital’ and an ‘analog’ mode, each describing a particular way of
organizing the boundary between the self and other (also Wæver 2004: 210).”9 The digital mode
of differentiation constructs the other in opposition to the self in which the other is automatically
excluded. In an analog mode of differentiation, the difference between the self and the other is
not particularly strong and absolute. As a consequence, a digital mode of differentiation will
produce exclusive identities; while an analog mode of differentiation will produce inclusive
identities with a wider acceptance of the other. In other words, a digital mode of differentiation
can be associated with modernity; while an analog mode of differentiation is typical of postmodernity.
The question is now, in which category does European identity belong? As we said
before, European identity falls into a sense of belonging to the same political community rather
than a naturally given identity; however, some characteristics such as the importance of

8
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territorial borders, the imposition of recurrent EU symbols and the exclusion of some countries
on the European soil, such as Turkey, portray the EU identity in a more digital than analog way.
Anderson’s concept of imagined communities will be essential to better understand this question.
How is Europe imagined?
Hüssle’s text on the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity offers
important insights into the metaphors and images used in political speeches and discourses to
show how the EU seemed configured in discourse by politicians and statemen. The author argues
that identities are imagined as much as they are constructed through metaphors and the use of a
specific language. There is a lack of research and literature on the use of European identity
through metaphors and political discourses; however, analyzing the language of international
politics can be a very powerful instrument to have a better idea of how the European identity was
conceived. Metaphors are figures of speech in which a word is used to substitute the correct
terms, but they are also more than simple substitutes for the original words and they can help us
to understand the political thinking behind the concept of European identity.
For his analysis, Hüssle starts from the EU enlargement to the East as a fundamental
political event for Europe in the '90s. After the Cold War, countries belonging to the block under
Soviet control expressed their desire to become members of the EU and negotiations started
around 1997. Political discourses used at the enlargement process seemed to build European
identity in a very specific way. Most of the speeches the author analyzes are focused on German
discourses and debates in the parliament that were happening at that time. Germany was one of
the biggest supporters of the EU enlargement toward the east. The author finds, for instance, that
some metaphors used in political discourses, such as the “family reunion”, the “homecoming”,
the “growing together”, belonging to the same “organism” or the “return home” of the east
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countries (very popular among German politicians), clearly show a primordial way of
constructing identity. The Eastern countries are portrayed as naturally belonging to the EU, as
part of the same organism or family whose separation was temporary.
European identity is based here on natural sources as an organism in which every EU
country is part of and it is an example of an identity construction based on primordial sources.
Therefore, countries that are part of the European organism can not be denied entry to the EU
since, as the author says: “Countries that are part of the European organism cannot be denied
accession to the EU as their separation from the EU is an unnatural state” 10.
The only metaphor that seems to construct a more civic form of European identity is,
according to him, the metaphor of the enlargement as a common path in which candidates to the
EU are seen to be on the same path or on the same way to the EU. There is no natural connection
or cultural basis for this identity. The metaphor of “the path” portrays European identity as
political cooperation and integration between countries that are on the same path and it is mostly
based on civic sources. Another metaphor constructed through civic sources is the one referring
to the East enlargement as an “entry into a house”, in which the EU members are considered as
inside the house and the candidates as waiting outside the house. This metaphor, like the path
one, constructs a European identity based on civic sources in which member states are living and
interacting in the same house. However, this metaphor also highlights the difference between
who is inside and who is outside, and once again the problem of inclusive and exclusive
identities emerges. It is important to acknowledge how these metaphors mostly come from a
German perspective, and as we know, primordial elements are stronger in German culture
compared to other European states. However, they still show how identity was conceived at the

10
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time through primordial sources using a digital mode of differentiation, dividing certain
categories of countries from others.
After analyzing different metaphors used in speeches in German politics, Hüssle
questions the postmodernity character of the EU and its identity. He states:
The family metaphor, the homecoming metaphor and the metaphor of growing together
primordialize European identity and set up a digital mode of differentiation. In this way,
European identity looks very similar to German identity. Obviously, there is nothing
post-modern about it, it is very much in line with modern, nationalist ways of
constructing identity (……) However, only one of the metaphors discussed actually
constructs the European identity in a post-modern/post-national way: the path metaphor
not only bases European identity on civic sources but also breaks with the habit of
imagining identity exclusively. Here, the other is no longer absolutely different, but only
different in degree. The self and other are not separated by a clearcut border, instead they
are connected by a transition zone, which can make it difficult to say where the self ends
and the other begins.11

These metaphors are very much in line with nationalism and a national way of
constructing identity. However, the metaphors of the house and the path constructs a European
identity as a combination of civic sources and digital mode of differentiation very similar to a
French form of identity. This type of identity is less nationalist and the distinction between the
self and the other is less underlined since the other can become part of the self. Again, the
process of constructing a European identity is ambiguous and both primordial and civic sources
are used. Nevertheless, the author seems to lean more toward a nationalistic construction of the
EU that leads to a supranational identity.

11
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Europe as an imagined community in the making
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism is the most influential book on nationalism. According to Anderson:
The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie
other nations. (…) It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in
which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinelyordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. (…) Finally, it is imagined as a community,
because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.12

Anderson argues that the nation is an imagined political community because it is
impossible to know every single other person that belongs to one’s nation, therefore he uses the
term “imagined”13.The same can be said for Europe; citizens of Europe can not meet every other
European or know every aspect of Europe. The nation is then limited in scope and sovereign in
nature and its border is well defined but changeable at the same time. As we know, the borders of
the European Union are flexible and they lack a complete definition; moreover, they have
changed over times and they keep changing as we can see with Brexit. The EU expanded to
adjacent countries and was able to integrate different borders. Sovereignty is also partially given
up by different member states, but the identity and freedom of every single nation-state still
matter.
According to Anderson, language is another important factor for the modern nation and a
nation's consciousness since it creates a stronger sense of unification. He observes: “Particular
languages can die or be wiped out, but there was and is no possibility of humankind's general
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linguistic unification. Yet this mutual incomprehensibility was historically of only slight
importance until capitalism and print created monoglot mass reading publics.”14
According to him, capitalism and the diffusion of printed documents and books played an
important role in the diffusion of a national or standard language. In Europe, there is no national
newspaper or tv channel, or a radio broadcast that can reach the majority of Europeans and
connect them into an imagined community; therefore, Europeans are not informed of what is
happening in the other European countries even if they may be briefly exposed to the news
coming from neighboring countries. Media is, without any doubt, an important instrument to
diffuse an image of a nation, and Europe lacks in the construction of a media that can reach
every single European state, despite several attempts in creating a unified media system. The
Internet constitutes a very powerful instrument that would be able to access a large portion of
Europeans, but it has not been explored by European politicians in favor of a European identity.
Authors Cirila Toplak & Irena Šumi in their essay “Europe (an Union): Imagined
Community in the Making?”, seem to come to the same conclusions as Hüssle. Through the
analysis of EU documents and important political speeches, they argue that reinforcement of a
European identity is not possible since most EU policies that have been adopted have a counterproductive effect on the creation of a common identity. The authors point out the lack of efforts
from EU politicians in creating a strong form of identity through EU policies, despite the
increasing awareness that in creating a common identity is an essential element for the
integration process. There is a paradox in the way European identity is considered a priority
within the EU’s political agenda, but citizens in the EU do not seem to identify with Europe and
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have a strong identity. The main problem is that the idea of European identity that was imposed
on EU citizens was more similar to a supranational identity reinforced by the single national
identities. As a consequence, this identity is often seen as in contrast to the national ones. The
two authors join Hüssle in a shared skepticism that the EU is a unique and unprecedented
experiment in history. As Toplak & Šumi say:
EU politicians appear to conceive of European identity as construed similarly to national
identities, although a European nation that would have to develop such sense of
belonging remains politically highly improbable. In the last two decades in particular we
have witnessed adoption and implementation of a whole range of policies seemingly
aiming at that objective, such as new symbols of Europe, the emerging common
European cultural policy, the European citizenship/passport, the recent attempts at formal
unification of European foreign policy and, above all, the European currency. 15
They analyze the idea of a common identity from the perspective of Anderson’s imagined
community to find out how the EU policies do not always support the idea of a European
integration project. Their analysis shows how this identity is often constructed in a very similar
way to national identities. There has been a process of adopting a series of policies aiming at
creating a European identity similar to a national one, for instance, the creation of European
symbols: European citizenship, passport, same currency, car tags, a national anthem, a common
European cultural policy and more. Currency in particular plays a fundamental role in the
construction of a common identity since a common currency can highlight the sense of belonging
to the same community. Political discourses on European identity can give a better idea of how
this identity was primarily conceived from a national point of view. For instance, Robert
Schuman, considered as one of the founding fathers of Europe, states in his declaration the need
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for a common economic system in Europe, referring to the need for a “European spirit” as a
sense of belonging to the same national consciousness.16
Another important contribution to the discussion of European identity comes from
German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas who believed in the idea of reinforcing a
European identity through the creation of a common constitution: “Why should we pursue the
project of a constitution for Europe? Let me address this question from two angles: (i) immediate
political goals, and (ii) dilemmas stemming from virtually irreversible decisions of the past. If we
consider the first, it is clear that while the original political aims of European integration have
lost much of their relevance, they have since been replaced by an even more ambitious political
agenda.”17 Habermas argues that the only way to continue the integration process in Europe is a
common constitution able to preserve a sense of consciousness among citizens and to reach
fundamental political goals for the union. For him, a common currency is not going to keep
Europeans united, and he criticizes the previous treaties elaborated by the EU as ineffective. The
idea of a European constitution was not welcomed by countries such as France and Britain and
brought a wave of skepticism around Europe. As he says “Let us then start from the question:
why should we pursue the project of an ‘ever-closer Union’ any further at all? Recent calls from
Rau, Schroeder and Fischer—the German President, Chancellor and Foreign Minister—to move
ahead with a European Constitution have met skeptical reactions in Great Britain, France and
most of the other member-states.”18 Habermas was probably conceiving of political identity
having Germany in his mind. Germany is often considered as an example of political evolution,

16

Schuman , Robert. “The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950.” European Union, 7 May 2020,
europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en.
17
Habermas, Jürgen. "Why Europe needs a constitution." Developing a constitution for Europe 1 (2004), 7.
18 Ibid,6.

17
being the only European democracy based on an imagined community united by a strong ethnic
nationalism, able to function as a political community with civic nationalism.
The Maastricht Treaty in 1991 developed by the European Commission aimed at the
reinforcement of European identity through European citizenship granted to every EU citizen
and a common currency, the euro. We can see here a sense of exclusiveness developed in the
idea of sharing the same citizenship. The common citizenship and currency are part of a series of
national symbols that were progressively imposed by the EU, such as the common flag and the
national anthem. The idea of a “European Federation” or “United States of Europe” probably
crossed the minds of EU politicians at the time with the majority of them having the model of the
United States in mind.
In the Document on the European Identity elaborated on December 14, 1973, in
Copenhagen, the importance of introducing the concept of European identity for foreign relations
was clearly stated for the first time. As the document states: “The Nine Member Countries of the
European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the
European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with
other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.”19
Here European identity is defined by salient concepts such as representative democracy, the rule
of law, social justice, and respect for human rights together with the importance of a common
market. Article 3 states that “The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common
European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing
convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the
determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity
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its originality and its own dynamism.”20 Unity is also strongly stressed through the diversity of
cultures together with the attachment to common values and having the same interests. In this
document, citizens are mainly united by a common attachment to the same principles, and the
European identity is mainly conceived as a political one that complements the national
identification to the member state.
These legal documents show how the meaning of a European identity acquires more
importance and a clearer purpose through the years. As I mentioned before, the EU enlargement
to the East was particularly problematic for the European identity. Conflicts and contradictions
surged among politicians on the inclusivity character of the European identity. For some, the
enlargement to the East after the fall of the Soviet Union would have threatened a common
identity since a too large of a Europe could have failed to find an identity. As authors Toplak and
Šumi says: “So while some politicians called for recognition of importance of European identity
as a future political project, others already mourned it in the light of a too large Europe. Clearly,
political conceptions of what (European) identity was were far from consensual.”21 For example,
the entry of Turkey into the EU has always been a very difficult topic, due to the European
attitude toward the Islamic world. A controversial speech was made by Franco Frattini, ex EU
Commissioner, in which religion and Christianity are seen as essential aspects of the identity as
in contrast to other religions such as Islam: “On one hand, we quite rightly recognize the
influence that religious characteristics have on other people’s identities, like Muslims, but on the
other, when we speak of our own religion, we keep our distance.” 22
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Similarly, in 2004, the President of the European Union, Hermann Von Rumpuy,
declared that the fundamental European values derived from Christianity and that this identity
will be threatened with the entry of an Islamic country such as Turkey. He stated: “Turkey is not
and never will be part of Europe” (…) the universal values which are in force in Europe, and
which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigor with the entry of a large
Islamic country such as Turkey.”23
In contrast, other politicians have stressed the strong character of inclusivity of the
European identity represented by the sharing of same values and the power of diversity. Austrian
politician and ex-minister for Europa and international affairs Michael Spindelegger declared
how: “In the interest of a democratic and all aspects well-functioning Europe we must jointly
address the complexities of identity issues in our increasingly multiethnic and multicultural
societies. Only the collective management of diversity in legal, political, and social terms can
lead to ownership in a democratic society and a ‘citizenship of the heart.”24
Inclusivity can also be seen in the speech of ex-president of the Czech Republic Vaclav
Havel who states how “Just because I’m a European, it doesn’t mean I cease to be a Czech. On
the contrary, as a Czech, I’m also a European.”25 Finally, authors Gerard Delanty and Christ
Rumford in their book Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of
Europeanization claim: “To be European is neither a matter of culture nor of politics as such.
Instead, the condition of being European is expressed more in an orientation to the world and
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which might be identified with the cosmopolitan spirit.”26 Therefore, being European seem to be
part of a general spirit of cosmopolitanism diffused all around Europe, meaning they recognize
that today we live in a world of diversity. As the authors say “to be European is not to identify
with something called Europe or have a common identity comparable to national identity and for
which hyphen is needed. (…) to be European is simply to recognize that one lives in a world that
does not belong to a specific people.”27 However, Delanty and Rumford do not exclude the
possibility that certain forms of identification can be considered as specifically European, for
instance, the use of the Euro, education, architecture, cityscape, and more that can represent a
certain European way of living and European society.
The shared values as the basis for a European identity is also analyzed in a policy
document prepared for the European Presidency of the European Union: “The Construction of
European Identity” by Manuel Castells. He aims at advancing the construction of European
identity, explaining why European identity is important and relevant for the European Union. He
claims:
Besides the economic dimension, European Union countries are now intertwined in a
web of institutional, social and political relationships which will grow in size and
complexity in the coming years, as new countries become associated with the EU, and as
the European institutions extend their realm of activity. Thus, we are too far in the
process of European integration (with considerable benefits for everybody, to this point)
to think the unthinkable: the future breakup of the European Union. And yet, the
European ground may be shakier than we believe. 28
Castells argues that the European Union is not just a political and union economy, but
through the years the EU countries seem to be connected through deeper and more complicated
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relationships. The economic aspect is without any doubt one of the most important elements to
consider, but it is not enough to strengthen European identity. For instance, the global economy
has been characterized by a series of crisis such as the Financial Crisis in 2008, the Greek Debt
Crisis, the Migrant crisis, and more recently Covid-19 crisis which all affected more or less the
process of European integration. Therefore, integrating Europe without a strong European
identity can be problematic, especially during a major crisis when member states seem to turn
into their nationalist identities. Castells illustrates identity as a set of values with a symbolic
meaning for people belonging to a specific community that goes beyond the economic aspect of
the EU. This set of values must have a deep meaning for most EU citizens, making it possible for
them to feel like they belong to a common European culture under the same institutional system.
Castells argues that European identity can not be based on religion, a common history, a
common language, or what we usually refer to as Western values. For this reason, he identifies
some elements of the European identity project that must have a common consensus through the
European countries, besides the connection to political democracy. These are shared feelings in
which citizens can agree and that can be the foundation of a European identity. The idea is to
create a European civil society in which the development of a European identity is possible with
a concrete policy. The main actors to create this form of identity must be the European national
governments through the European Union; a form of European identity is possible if European
societies reflect and engage themselves in a common project of integration.
Inclusive nationalists and Exclusive Nationalists
German scholar Thomas Risse elucidates how the more we tend to interact inside a social
group in a very positive way the more we are likely to identify with this group. Citing American
sociologist Neil Fligstein, he claims: “In sum, Fligstein makes an interactionist argument that is
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also consistent with social psychological theories of identity: the more people interact
transnationally across borders in Europe, the more they identify with Europe.”29
If we apply this concept to the European Union and European identity, a good example of the
principle in action is the foundation of the Erasmus project in 1987, precisely created to diffuse a
sense of European identity through mobility and study abroad exchange programs in European
countries. Fligstein offers a very interesting theory according to which higher education can lead
to a stronger European identity, following Karl W. Deutsch’s theory of integration. He claims:
Deutsch’s theory helps us make sense of what has and has not happened in Europe in the
past fifty years. A European identity is first and foremost going to arise among people
who associate with each other across national boundaries. As European economic, social,
and political fields develop, they cause the regular interaction of people from different
societies. It is the people who are involved in these routine interactions who are most
likely to come to see themselves as Europeans and as involved in a European national
project. In essence, Europeans are going to be people who have the opportunity and
inclination to travel to other countries and frequently interact with people in other
societies in the Europe- wide economic, social, and political fields.30
European citizens have the opportunity to travel and interact more frequently with other people
from different societies inside the Eurozone. Looking at data coming from the European Survey
Studies or Eurobarometer, traveling abroad is usually connected to positive attitudes toward the
EU. There is an article published in the Italian newspaper La Stampa interviewing Umberto Eco
about the debt crisis in Europe and the future of Europe in general. The writer praised, among all
the EU initiatives, the ERASMUS, underlining how it is not warring, but the culture that forges
our identity as European. According to him, Erasmus is rarely mentioned in the business sections
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of newspapers but “It has created the first generation of young Europeans.”31 He also argued that
it should be mandatory and not only for students but for taxi drivers and professionals too; only
if we spend time in other European countries, we can deepen the European identity.
People who usually identify with Europe belong to privileged social classes, are more
educated, and are more likely to speak several languages. This brings to the basic definition of
exclusive nationalist vs inclusive nationalist well explained in Thomas Risse’s book A
Community of Europeans? It has been argued that elite identities have been crucially important
for the evolution of the European integration project. The integration project was possible thanks
to European citizens with inclusive national identities, meaning they can identify Europe as a
secondary identity after their primarily national identification with the member state. Europeans
with inclusive national identities are usually defined as citizens belonging to a higher social
class, with better higher education, more likely to travel often in other European countries, and
more likely to speak more languages; therefore, more opened to identify themselves with other
Europeans and Europe as a whole.
Neil Fligstein argues how education, age, and income are essential factors for a European
identity. If you are well educated and belong to the upper-middle classes, you are more likely to
see a strong identification with Europe, have more positive attitudes toward immigration, and
have more cosmopolitan values. However, a series of events, such as the Financial Crisis in 2008
and more recently the Migration Crisis has brought a large part of citizens to associate
exclusively with their national identities. Exclusive nationalists tend to be older, less educated,
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less likely to travel, or speak more languages and they belong to the worker or lower classes32.
They usually belong to right-wing political parties with a strong attachment to their nation's
values, resulting in attitudes of hostility toward immigrants and people coming from the outside.
This part of the population tends to perceive immigrants as a threat to one’s national culture, and
work against a process of integration in Europe, inspiring the surge of populism and right-wing
movements around Europe. Hence, primordial and nationalist identities together with low
occupation levels are the main sources of Euroscepticism.
According to Thomas Risse, we can distinguish two groups of people regarding their
identification level with Europe:
On the one hand, there are “the Europeans” and even a small group of “Eurostars” who
interact transnationally, are highly educated, have high-skilled occupational levels, and
hold mostly cosmopolitan values. This group feels very much attached to Europe and the
EU. On the other hand, exclusive nationalists who reject Europe and the EU have less
transnational interactions, lower education levels, and work mostly in blue-collar jobs.
While both groups hold strong feelings—either positive or negative—about Europe and
the EU, there is a large group in the middle who identifies with Europe as a secondary
identity, the inclusive nationalists.33
Identifying these two groups of “Europeans” it is essential to understand how citizens in Europe
reacted to the refugee crisis.
This literature review has produced critical concepts that I will continue to develop in
relation to the influx of refugees to Europe. As we can see, in recent years, the question of a
European identity has produced a lot of materials and research. However, scholars can not still
agree on a standard definition of European identity. The majority admit that European identity is
in the making; hence a clear definition of what it means is still ambiguous. It is a possibility that,
if a strong European identity existed, the EU would have been able to deal with the refugee crisis
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in a very different way. Still today, there is a strong division between the way European identity
is conceived through political discourses and the EU's actual policies to strengthen the sense of
belonging to a common identity. This does not exclude the fact that the EU is an unprecedented
experiment in history; the EU can still be considered a successful project; nevertheless, more
vigorous policies are needed to forge a stronger identity among citizens.
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3. Methodology
In this thesis, I document and analyze as much as possible the meaning of a European identity
and apply it to one of the biggest challenges for the EU posed by the Refugee/Migrant crisis.
Among all the many difficulties that the EU had to face in the last few years, the
Migrant/Refugee Crisis in Europe uniquely challenges the meaning of a European identity and
the integration project. The refugee crisis is a perfect illustration of the limitations connected to
the European integration project and the paradox and contradictions behind the idea of an
inclusive form of identity in Europe. As mentioned in the literature review, Europeans shared the
same set of values, such as respect for human rights, freedoms, religious tolerance, democracy,
respect for diversity, and more, which makes them "Europeans". However, these values do not
extend to refugees and migrants who are excluded continuously from the European society and
nearly dehumanized. The Schengen agreement promotes a borderless Europe, and the same EU
has praised them as the end of borders; however, the arrival of migrants from outside Europe
provoked the reintroduction and reinforcement of the same boundaries. I will focus on borders
and Fortress Europe, where the European identity is constructed and the sense of Europeanness
is elaborated.
Immigration policies in Europe have become more and more rigid and subject to EU
regulations. The year 2015/ 2016 represents the peak of the crisis in Europe, with large waves of
migrants, never seen before in the modern history of Europe, arriving in the Mediterranean.
Countries located in the South of Europe and especially the island of Lampedusa in the
Mediterranean have become the symbol of Fortress Europe, a term used to illustrate the EU's
attempt to close its borders to non-EU citizens or from whoever comes from the outside. With
free and open borders in Europe, more refugees and migrants were able to pass from one
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member country member to another, generating chaos in the EU, incapable of keeping under
control the number of refugees entering the country. It seems that the success of the
Schengenland leads inevitably to Fortress Europe.
The removal of borders inside Europe led to a stronger sense of identification between
Europeans living in the same EU zone and, at the same time, a stronger sense of exclusion from
whom comes from the outside. For this reason, I decided to focus on the migrant emergency in
Europe to show the fragility and weakness of a European identity and European integration
project which claims to be inclusive of cultural diversity. The creation of EU citizenship and
identity created a division between "us", those inside the EU, and "them", "the other" often
identified as the immigrants. For my refugee case study, I decided to focus on texts that analyze
the role of borders, the Mediterranean Sea, and Fortress Europe to better represent European
identity in relation to the migrant crisis.
When I started researching this topic, I noticed how discussions and literature
investigating European identity lacked clarity and coherence. Theories regarding a European
identity seem to fall into ambiguity, without a clear definition of what this identity means and
implies. This is particularly true if applied to the case study of the refugee crisis.
Most of the information I have gathered for my thesis comes from academic and
scholarly articles focused on European studies and refugee issues. The Internet has been a
fundamental instrument, especially Google Scholar's use gave me access to a range of different
articles focused on European identity. Together with Google Scholar, the University of San
Francisco's library, Gleeson Library, provides me access to most articles and books throughout
my thesis.
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A limitation I noticed while I was researching is the lack of case studies related to the
European identity. The majority of the resources I have found focused on the meaning and
existence of a European identity and the different EU policies adopted through times;
nevertheless, they do not always apply this identity concept to a specific case study. The
Financial Crisis, the Migration Crisis, Brexit, and even Covid-19 are excellent examples of a
European identity's fragility and inconsistency. Every time the EU is facing a crisis, there is an
inevitable return to nationalist and sometimes extremist identities. I did not find specific case
studies focused on European identity applied to a particular event, except Brexit, which is
probably the most used case study to show the inefficiency of EU integration policies.
The way these events have threatened and put at risk a European identity is hardly explored by
scholars, limiting themselves to mention them briefly. This is why I decided to "test" the concept
of European identity on a specific case study.
One of the biggest challenges was applying the concept of European identity in the
refugee crisis context. I decided to focus on the idea of border imperialism and fortress Europe
to elucidate better how borders play a fundamental role in identity construction and how Europe
has become a Fortress in which some individuals can enter, while others will inevitably clash
with European culture. It is also important to remember that the threat to one's identity and
culture is only a small part of the Migration Crisis. The role of media in Europe is probably one
of the main reasons for negative attitudes toward immigrants, but this, of course, will not be part
of my thesis, and it requires a thesis of its own.
Other critical primary resources used in my thesis are official legal documents issued by
the European Parliament. The Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Paris have some legal
backgrounds that can be useful; however, the concept of European identity was first introduced
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in the '70s. From then on, it will be considered a priority for the EC agenda. For instance, in
1973, the “Declaration on European Identity” drafted in the Copenhagen European Summit
introduced the importance of cooperation among the Nine-member states to face global threats.
The Maastricht Treaty in 1993 is another crucial document to understand better the European
identity and the concept of European citizenship. Together with treaties, speeches made by
influential political figures on European identity issues helped me better understand how they
perceive the integration process.
The European Union's official website, Europa.eu, is essential to find a wide range of
official documents, publications, data, statistics, policy reviews, and more. It is possible to find
the necessary information on how the EU works, its goals, strategies, latest news, and links to
other websites. In addition to that, the official website of the research and studies center on
Europe, Foundation Robert Schuman, gives access to information on European issues and the
meaning of European identity. It is the reference research center developing studies on the
European Union, specifically constructed to promote the construction of Europe and its policies
promoting its goals everywhere around Europe. It contains beneficial research papers,
publications and it organizes conferences on critical European issues.
Also, I use data and surveys from Eurobarometer to illustrate better the attitudes of
European toward refugees and their sense of belonging to the same identity. Established in 1974,
Eurobarometer is the official European Commission survey system and contains immense
resources with interviews and surveys made in every EU country on different topics. It
investigates the feelings and reactions of specific social groups selected to analyze a particular
subject. In addition to Eurobarometer, Frontex reports on the EU parliament's official website
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offer insights into the European Union's migratory situation and the challenges represented by
border management and security.
Finally, I am originally from Italy, and back in 2015, I was about to start my first
semester as an undergraduate student. At that time, the refugee crisis was at its peak, and it was
bombarding every Italian newspaper or tv channel. In my contemporary history class, we often
discussed the problems of integration and the threat people felt to their own culture and identity.
The Mediterranean Sea and the Island of Lampedusa became the symbol of the crisis and
Fortress Europe, and being geographically close to it, made me interested in this topic in the first
place. Consequently, some of the information used directly comes from my undergraduate
lectures and experiences.
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4. Case Study: Refugee Crisis in Europe
4.1 Background
This thesis uses the current refugee and migrant crisis as an illustrative example to show
the challenges the EU faces regarding its integration project and European identity construction.
The EU is constantly confronted with the obstacle of finding a coherent political, cultural, and
social identity; however, the crisis has shown its fragility and substantial lack of solidarity when
it was needed. But if European identity is still not well defined, how can the refugees' crisis
threaten European culture?
Author Biedenkopf and his co-authors in the book What holds Europe Together? ask:
What is European culture? What is Europe? These are questions that must be constantly
posed anew. So long as Europe is of the present, and not simply the past, they can never
be conclusively answered. Europe's identity is something that must be negotiated by its
peoples and institutions. Europeans can and must adapt themselves and their institutions,
so that European values, traditions, and conceptions of life can live on and be effective.
At the same time, the Union and its citizens must make their values endure as a basis of a
common identity through ever-changing conditions.34
The authors explain that the meaning of being European must be constantly negotiated because
conditions are always changing in Europe. The cohesion of the EU is possible only through the
solidarity of member states. As we said before, the meaning of identity is complicated and
ambiguous, implying a component of sameness and distinctiveness at the same time. Collective
identities are not stable, fixed, and unique as nationalists often presuppose, but they are subjected
to change from external circumstances. Authors Wodak and Boukala state in their “European
Identities and the Revival of nationalism in the European Union: “A European identity defined as
a collective identity unifies the members of the European Union or the residents of Europe and
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excludes the 'Others', those outside of Europe's boundaries.” 35 Consequently, we can conclude
that there is a component of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in the same European identity
concept that the refugee crisis magnifies. Those coming from outside Europe are identified as
"the other" who paradoxically make European identity stronger since identifying the other is
almost necessary for identity construction processes. At the same time, a crisis such as the
migrant one led to the rise of EU skeptic political ideologies expressed by far-right parties. There
has been the adoption of strict immigration measures against outsiders. The rhetoric of exclusion
has become part of the discourse on European identity and European culture since clear
boundaries between "us" and "them" must be defined.
The refugee crisis in 2015/2016 tested the EU's solidarity to deal with a situation of these
dimensions and the existence of a common European identity, showing its fragility and paradox
at the same time. Tensions in everyday life started to surge in Europeans lives with the arrival of
masses of non-European immigrants. The sudden appearance of asylum seekers and refugees
from Arab and African countries, Muslim or non-Muslim, generated panic and confusion in the
European governments and populations. In 2015 and 2016, according to Eurostat, more than 1.2
million refugees seek asylum in the EU, nearly as twice more than in previous years, and media
and politicians labeled the problem as the Refugee/Migrant Crisis. 36
This situation was unprecedented in the history of modern Europe. Brexit is often
regarded as a direct consequence of migration in Europe. European policies such as the
Schengen Agreement that provides for freedom of movement between member states started to
collapse, and reveal their inefficiencies were revealed during the crisis. European diplomats were
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caught by surprise, struggling to manage compassion, balance, and support for people who chose
exile for economic, security, and personal reasons. At the same time, the EU was unable to
develop a common migration policy that could work for all member countries.
It is essential to mention that all EU member states have signed the 1951 Geneva
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Still, in practice, their commitment to it has been
partial and not always visible. Some national governments have tried to avoid their legal
obligations in processing applications for asylum. Other states acted with the mass deportation of
refugees and asylum seekers without considering their claims first, violating the Convention's
rules. The UK, for instance, introduced tough policies to isolate and marginalize the refugee
community who already entered Europe. The problem lies in the fact that European immigration
policy is full of contradictions and paradoxes, and the tragic consequence is the loss of human
lives. Since 1988, more than 16,000 migrants have died in an attempt to reach the Mediterranean.
The majority drowned at sea, and others committed suicide in detention centers when their
asylum application was rejected. Female migrants trying to reach Europe have frequently been
victims of rape and sexual violence from other migrants or the same police. Refugees have been
found themselves in perennial incertitude or limbo, unable to become part of European society.
Between 2015 and 2016, member states agreed on a series of measures to share
responsibility for the refugees who already were on European soil and manage possible future
flows. The EU spent several billion euros to create a common asylum and migration policy
trying to support member states in accommodating migrants and refugees. Referring to the
budget and the EU funding on migration inside the Union in 2014-202037, the two main funding
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tools are considered the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Borders and
Visa strand of the Internal Security Fund (ISF). According to the EU parliament resources,
AMIF has a budget of €6.89 billion and ISF Borders and Visa of €2.76 billion making the total
budget of €9.65 billion. The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) is involved in
national and EU actions to promote and manage in an efficient way the arrival of migrants with
the development of a common approach to migration. AMIF funds initiatives aiming at support
member states for the integration of migrants. Due to the crisis in 2015 and 2016, the initial
budget of €3.14 billion was increased to €6.89 billion at the end of the year 2017. 78% of the
AMIF resources were distributed to member states in order to adopt multi-year national
programs. The remaining funds are used to support other actions of interest for the EU,
transnational actions, emergency assistance or the European Migration Network. The Internal
Security Fund Borders and Visa (ISF) has the main objective of contributing to the level of
security in the European Union, promoting a strict control and protection of external borders and
issuing of Schengen visas. It serves as a way to detect illegal immigration through borders and
visas. Its budget ranges among €3.89 billion for the years 2014-2020, and it is used for specific
Frontex equipment, coordination, cooperation and administration. 65% of the resources are used
for shared management among the member states. All members participated in the increase and
improvement of ISF borders and Visa instruments, with the exceptions of Ireland and the United
Kingdom. Once again, the emergency represented by the migration crisis pushed for a large
increase of the initial budget. Both the ISF and AMIF belong to the area of home affairs which
includes another six decentralized agencies with resources of €2.13 billion, later increased to
€4.14 billion. In addition to that, the EU parliament and Council has to mobilize a series of
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additional resources making the total amount to respond to the crisis and the external borders
control more than €20 billion.
Another budget tool that is being used in response to the migration crisis in Europe is the
EU Trust Funds: the Madad Trust Fund and the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Madad
Trust Fund was a response to the Syrian crisis and provides aid for Syria’s neighbouring
countries. It is a fund created to help refugees and their host communities with the largest part of
the fund financing actions in Turkey. The Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was created to
address irregular immigration and displaced people in Africa, with the main objective of
encouraging people to stay in their countries instead of embarking in the Mediterranean to reach
Europe. It is important to remember that the majority of these funds come from the EU budget
and rarely from contributions from each member state.
In 2020, while the member states in the EU were also facing the threat represented by
Covid-19 crisis, they decided the priorities for the Union for the next years by agreeing to a
massive recovery fund for the damages represented by the pandemic to the EU’s economy. In the
month of July 2020, there has been four intense days of negotiations for the EU in which the
leaders agreed in a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and Recovery Fund. The MFF
is the European Union’s budget that usually covers 7 years. In a few words, the EU migration
policy was only a small part of the budget representing 0.93% for the MFF 2014-2020.38
Considering the next 7 years, 2021-2027, the Commission decided to increase the resources and
the budget to support migration and borders policies; in particular the budget would have
increased from €10 billion for the years 2014-2020 to €31 billion for the next seven years, 2021-
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2027, nearly three times more than the previous one. The main goal is to strengthen border
control, Frontex and to develop a common and standard agreement on immigration. As we can
see, sharing responsibilities among member states remain one of the priorities of the new
framework.
Despite trying to achieve a common policy on refugees, some countries ended up taking
in more refugees. Some countries were more welcoming toward refugees and migrants than
others; for instance, Germany and Sweden are often considered the most welcoming member
states. More specifically, Germany became, since 2012, the number one destination country for
asylum seekers in Europe with 442,000 applications just in the year 2015 39. Sweden has around
1,600 applicants for every 100,000 people, receiving more refugees per capita than any other EU
country in 2015. These numbers are huge if compared to France with only 110 applicants per
100,000 people and the UK with 60 asylum seekers per 100,000 people in 2015. Sweden and
Germany have been often referred to as the most refugee-friendly countries in Europe overall.
These countries tend to have a strong inclusive culture with a more liberal asylum regime. The
importance of respecting the Schengen cooperation and giving an overall idea of solidarity in the
EU may be what pushed some countries to take a different and more welcoming position, while
other member countries have resisted accepting refugees.
The two main routes to arrive in Europe are from Turkey to the Greek islands and from
North Africa to the Italian island of Lampedusa in Sicily. Italy and Greece became the “hot
spots” for migrants arrivals, and they are considered entry or arrival countries where asylum
seekers came first. The majority of refugees arriving in southern Europe had the precise
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objective of reaching countries located in northern Europe such as Germany, Sweden, Denmark,
and the Netherlands, considered a better option for economic opportunities and quality of life.
However, even if Italy and Greece were not the final destination for the majority of refugees,
they were the main point of entry with about 850,000 arrivals in Greece and 153,842 in Italy
only in 2015. Most of the administrative and legal responsibilities were put in Greece’s and
Italy's hands, who were overwhelmed by the system and incapable of dealing with asylum
seekers' numbers. Following the Dublin Convention, these countries located in the
Mediterranean had the whole responsibility for considering each refugee’s and determining
whether they were eligible for resettlement or whether they would be repatriated.
As Frontex's report in 2015 states:
As the vast majority of migrants arrive undocumented, screening activities are essential
to properly verify their declaration of nationality. False declarations of nationality are
common among nationals who are unlikely to obtain asylum in the EU or who are liable
to be returned to their country of origin or transit, or who perceive an advantage in
speeding up their journey. With large numbers of arrivals remaining essentially doubtful
for a variety of reasons, false identification documents, no identification documents,
concerns over the validity of claimed nationality, etc., and with no thorough check nor
any penalty for those making such false declarations, there is a risk that some persons
representing a security threat for the EU will take advantage of this situation. 40
Consequently, Greece’s and Italy's registration process are of fundamental importance for the
security of Europe. Nevertheless, the failure to register and process single cases both in Greece
and Italy is already a signal of a fragile support system.
The situation pushed the German government to negotiate an agreement with Tukey in
2016, a desperate attempt to control the number of refugees and migrants from Turkey to the
Greek islands. It was intended to discourage refugees arriving in Europe. In exchange, the EU
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agreed to resettle one Syrian refugee from Turkey for each person who was returned to their
facilities. The agreement was primarily meant to help Greece; however, when the number of
refugees crossing Turkey to arrive in Greece decreased, the number of refugees arriving in Italy
doubled with the EU-Turkey agreement's approval. In fact, at the beginning of 2016, Italy
received more than 90,000 migrants and, according to the UNHCR more than 2,500 people lost
their lives in the Mediterranean between January and May 201641. At the end of the year 2016,
Italy received a total of 181,436 sea arrivals with an estimated 4,578 people who died or went
missing.
European migration policies were intended to manage and control the chaos inside the
continent; however, their exclusionary character did little to challenge the rise of nationalism and
populism in member countries. Protests and acts of racism increased all around Europe, with
fascist resurgences undermining the democracy of European governments. From one side,
migrants were recognized as a vital part of the job market and economy; from the other side, the
governments contributed to the model of fortress Europe by supporting increased border
enforcement.
The situation has also been labeled as “the Schengen crisis” since The Schengen
Agreement, which abolished internal borders in order to allow free mobility between member
states in the EU, became a problem for the first time. Mobility among member states is
considered a privilege for European citizens and a way to increase a sense of European
belonging due to citizens’ constant interaction from different countries. Nevertheless, the lack of
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barriers became a problem in the context of the refugee crisis and the reintroduction or, at least, a
clear delineation of boundaries became once again necessary.
The Schengen cooperation started back in 1985, establishing freedom and free mobility
of goods, services, capital, and people inside the European community. In 1997 with the Treaty
of Amsterdam, the Schengen cooperation became part of the EU project of integration. Only in
the future would it reveal its fragility with the incapability of managing immigrants and refugees
moving from one member state to another. Most importantly, the Schengen area includes
countries with very different legal structures, such as Switzerland or Norway, that are not
officially in the EU, making it harder to adhere to EU migration policies. The refugee crisis has
demonstrated Schengen’s inner fragilities, showing huge differences between states participating
in the agreement. The biggest paradox represented by the refugee crisis is probably the need to
contain immigrants from one side and the necessity to maintain a borderless territory to respect
the values of free mobility from another side.
4.2 Euroscepticism and Rise of Populism
As mentioned in the literature review, Thomas Risse's distinction between inclusive
identity and exclusive national identity in his book A Community of Europeans? can provide
assistance in understanding citizen's responses to the refugee crisis in Europe and the consequent
rise of populism in the EU. Inclusive nationalists are those who identify both with their nationstate and Europe, supporting the European integration project; exclusive nationalists on the other
side see their national identity as the only possible identification. Exclusive nationalists,
however, are more likely to be Eurosceptic and xenophobic since other types of identities, such
as the European one, are excluded. Factors like age, education, income, and social class are
fundamental to determine the distinction. People who are young, well educated, and coming
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from an upper or middle class have higher chances of connecting to Europe and European
identity. It has often been said how European elites founded the European project since they
benefit from integration. They are more likely to speak more languages, travel around the world
and in Europe, and have more knowledge about the EU institutions. Having more cosmopolitan
values could also mean positive attitudes toward immigrants and refugees arriving in Europe.
American sociologist Neil Fligstein sustains that higher education and constant
interaction among people can lead to a more potent form of European identity:
Deutsch's theory helps us make sense of what has and has not happened in Europe in the
past fifty years. A European identity is first and foremost going to arise among people
who associate with each other across national boundaries. As European economic, social,
and political fields develop, they cause the regular interaction of people from different
societies. It is the people who are involved in these routine interactions who are most
likely to come to see themselves as Europeans and as involved in a European national
project. In essence, Europeans are going to be people who have the opportunity and
inclination to travel to other countries and frequently interact with people in other
societies in the Europe- wide economic, social, and political fields. 42
Traveling abroad is generally considered a fundamental element connected to positive attitudes
with the EU. The more people travel, the more they seem to identify with Europe as a whole. An
interaction that could be seen from the migration point of view, in which foreigners' arrival is not
seen as a possible threat to one's culture and identity. An example to illustrate this concept is
represented by Erasmus Programme which has become one of the symbols of the construction of
European identity. It was specifically created in 1987 with the main objective of consolidating a
common identity among students who have the opportunity to study and live in another
European country for a certain time, creating the so-called Erasmus Citizen or Erasmus
Generation.
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On the other hand, exclusive nationalists tend to be older and less educated. They usually
hold very hostile attitudes toward immigrants and refugees or foreigners in general, and
everything that comes from the outside is perceived as a threat to their national culture.
According to Risse, primordial and strong national identities go together with low skilled jobs
and low education levels, and they are a powerful source of Euroscepticism and xenophobia.
One example to consider is Brexit. Many case studies found out that Brexit voters were more
likely to have lower levels of education. Researchers from the University of Leicester sustained
that if more people in the UK went to university, the outcome of the vote would have been
different. They sustained that access to higher education has been fundamental in determining
how people voted43. Age and gender were other important factors, but not as significant as
education level. The result was that university educated British people voted to stay in the EU
and had a better knowledge of the EU institutions.
Exclusive nationalists are more likely to hold negative views toward migrants coming to
the EU and more likely to belong to Eurosceptic political parties. The chaos and confusion the
crisis created facilitated the rise of Eurosceptical populist parties and movements that were able
to mobilize a large part of the population. Eurosceptic parties did not develop sentiments against
the EU and migration; but they took advantage of the present situation to mobilize attitudes and
feelings already existing among the minority of Europeans.44 An example is the Front National
of Jean-Marie Le Pen, one of the most extremist right-wing party in Europe, containing antiSemitic and other racist elements. The party has assumed in the last years very strong antiimmigration, Islamophobic positions and a sense of strong protection of French people and
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French economy against the rest of the world and the same EU. The party has expressed several
times its position against the role of the EU, claiming a strong French nationalism, and gaining
support from the working class and the unemployed. In Austria, the revival of nationalist
tendencies is represented by Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), founded back in 1955. It
represents a form of right-wing populist extremism, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim. If it is true
that this party has existed for a long time, the crucial years for the immigration crisis, such as
2016, provoked a sharp rise of its popularity with the promotion of anti-EU and anti-immigrant
policies. At the same time, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 12.6 % in 2017 upsetting the
political system in Germany and, in the same year, politician Andrej Babis, strongly antiimmigration, became Czech Republic’s Prime Minister. 45 Particularly in Germany, the decision
of Angela Merkel to accept more refugees from Syria than other EU countries provoked a crisis
in Germany and the rapid rise of AfD.
Another perfect example of the rise of populism in Europe is represented by far-right
Lega Nord in Italy. Its leader, Matteo Salvini, was able to obtain nearly 17% of the vote in
national elections back in 2018, exceeding the expectations and rising concern about a new
possible form of fascism in Italy. Salvini gained most of his support from the norther regions of
Italy such as Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto, with a new form of populism in Italy that was
able to capture the attention of a huge number of voters. Historically, La Lega Nord was founded
with the precise objective of giving more independence to Italy’s norther regions, creating a
strong division between South and North. Nevertheless, with the refugees and Euro crisis,
Salvini directed his ideas toward a sharp criticism of the EU institutions and of the Euro in
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general, defining the use of Euro as a “Crime against humanity” 46 and asking for an exit of Italy
from the EU. With the refugee crisis in 2015, the League took advantage of the anger of Italians
toward the large number of migrants arriving in the Mediterranean to focus its ideologies against
the arrival of refugees and immigrants in Italy. Salvini became a champion in developing harsh
migration rules, trying to stop migrant ship for touching the Italian soil. At the very beginning of
2020, he was accused of abusing power while Minister of Interior when, back in 2019, he
prevented and blocked a migrant ship from arriving in Lampedusa. He refused to let 100
migrants land in Italy, leaving them at sea and in terrible conditions, violating international
conventions on refugees’ rights. Italy’s senate has voted recently to put Salvini on trial for
holding migrants at sea, possible facing at least 15 years in prison.47
If it is true that right-wing extremist parties have always existed in Europe, migration
contributed hugely to the fortification of populism in Europe. If we look at the agenda of the
majority of populist parties, the immigration and refugee issues represent their top priority, used
to exploit fear of terrorism and cultural threats. The increased support for the populist right
provoked a sharp decline for the center-left and moderate parties, while center-right parties felt
the need to shift toward a populist rhetoric in order to gain support and popularity. An example is
Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia who never really had strong attitudes toward refugees
and immigrants but decided to deport more than 600,000 refugees who has arrived in Italy since
2015.48
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It is interesting to notice how discourses around preserving a European culture were used
against the same EU as incapable of unity and solidarity. There was a process of politicizing 49
the migrant and refugee crisis from these political parties, especially from the identity point of
view. Their debates focused on the main difference between them vs. us, or inside vs. outside.
They promoted an idea of fortress Europe that must preserve its purity together with the
importance of nationalism and national history and culture, which is threatened. The French
Front National, the German AfD, the Polish PiS, and the Italian La Lega Nord are examples of
nationalistic, right-wing populist parties supporting countries leaving the EU from one side and
the exclusion of refugees and migrants in Europe from the other. Not all nationalist parties in
Europe supported an exit from the EU, but the majority was clearly against refugees' arrival and
welcoming on their soil. Their political discourses were able to cause insecurity among citizens
who felt threatened by foreigners, complaining about mobilizing more robust security measures.
There is the formation of a “Myth of Invasion”, 50 to use the term taken from Hein De Haas’s
essay on “The Myth of Invasion: the inconvenient realities of Africa migration to Europe”. Even
if the essay was published years before the migration crisis in 2015, the term is very useful to
understand how far-right political parties are exploiting the idea of an invasion coming from
African or Middle Easter countries which can possibly threaten their culture and heritage. More
specifically, the role of media is fundamental in creating sensational images, giving the idea of
waves of migrants trying desperately to reach Europe. Images of extreme poverty, violence,
degradation are common in the media to exploit typical stereotypes of violent or poor migrants.
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Politicians and leaders are the one using terms such as “invasion” which arouse feelings of fear
among citizens. If there is also, from one side, the political and economic aspect that migrants
could steal jobs from Europeans, the depiction of an invasion of migrants that could put in
danger European identity seem to be the most powerful.
These political parties were asking for severe restrictions of refugees in Europe,
lamenting the fact that Europe was receiving too many refugees, going against an idea of a
multicultural Europe. They were extremely successful in spreading anti-immigration sentiments
all around Europe, creating further chaos in the EU.
4.3 European Identity in crisis?
In September 2016, the European Commission president, Jean Claude Junker, addressed
the European parliament with a plan for uniting Europe, stating that the EU faces an existential
and unprecedented crisis.51 Two main events brought him to define the crisis as existential; the
first event is the UK leaving the EU in 2016, known as the Brexit effect. The second is the
migrant/refugee crisis, expressing the necessity to control and manage the vast numbers of
migrants arriving from Africa and the Middle East. The two events are more connected to each
other than it might happen since the incapability of managing the refugee crisis is often
considered as one of the main reasons for the UK to leave the EU.
At the time, border control and terrorism were the centers of attention, and Europeans
asked for more assurance and stability from the EU. In fact, the construction of linkages
connecting migrants and refugees to terrorist activities is part of the construction of migration as
a threat, frequently abused my media. The EU's incapability of assuring peace and security in the
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territory provoked a crisis in its citizens' identity and a decreased satisfaction with the EU.
Immigration flows were followed by the closing of borders and the building up of walls leading
to violence and abuse of human rights. Author Michalis Bartsidis in his essay focused on the
work of the French philosopher Balibar “European Paradoxes of Humanness: Discussing Etienne
Balibar's work on Europe"; uses the term "internal exclusion" or "internal closure" 52 to describe
how European governments' politics aim at excluding diversities. As soon as refugees cross the
European borders, they are confined in deportation centers where they are frequently under
surveillance or stocked in a situation of perennial uncertainty. According to Balibar, there is a
paradoxical scheme of exclusion and inclusion in which foreigners are welcomed in the country
to be later considered outsiders or aliens by the society.
The phenomenon of migration in Europe increased the fear of being exposed to
economic, social, political regression and violent attacks. Looking at the Eurobarometer 84 of
Autumn 2015, a significant percentage of citizens expressed their concerns toward the EU
institutions with a rise in the numbers of people who do not trust the EU.53 Optimism about the
EU's future has been grown since 2013, but in 2015 it decreased with pessimism exceeding 40%
for the first time since 2013. Looking at the second section of Standard Eurobarometer 84 about
Europeans' main concerns, we can see how immigration is considered the most critical problem
the EU faces. Right after immigration, citizens point out terrorism and the lack of protection and
safety in the EU as the second main issue. The polls show immigration as the primary concern on
a national level, not only on a European one.
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On another section focused on negative and positive feelings toward immigration; it is
interesting to notice how most Europeans have positive feelings toward immigration of people
from other EU member states. However, immigration coming from outside the EU, from nonEuropeans, evoke perceptions of fear and terrorism. As the results show:
Majorities of the population have a negative feeling about immigration of people from
outside the EU in 25 countries (up from 23 in spring 2015), in particular in Slovakia
(86%), Latvia (86%), Hungary (82%), the Czech Republic (81%) and Estonia (81%).
Conversely, majorities of the population take a positive view of the immigration of
people from outside the EU in Sweden (70%), Spain (53%) and Ireland (49%). (…)
Compared with spring 2015, negative views have gained ground in 18 countries, most
notably in Romania (54%, +20 percentage points) and Slovenia (76%, +19). 54
Not only Europeans perceived in a negative way immigration from outside Europe, but these
feelings have increased in several countries if compared to the same analysis done in Spring
2015.
When asked about measures to fight illegal immigration, nine Europeans out of ten say
that the EU needs more decisive steps to fight illegal immigration coming from outside Europe,
and these actions should involve the EU on a national level. More than two-thirds of Europeans
say they favor a common European policy on migration; however, the results also show how the
respondents have changed their minds since Spring 2015 and are unsure about the possibility of
finding a joint agreement on migration.
As we can see from the Eurobarometer results, the public perception is that the EU was
unprepared to handle the enormous waves of populations entering the territory. Moreover, the
phenomenon of migration was later accompanied by a series of terrorist attacks in European's
cities for which migration is often unjustly blamed for. A direct consequence of these two
dynamics was the feeling of frustration and fear regarding the preservation of European identity
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that seems to be threatened by the massive influx of immigrants who arrived on European soil.
As author Ana-Maria Bolborici says in her “The Immigration Crisis-Reflections concerning the
crisis of European Identity”: “The core of the refugee issue is that we are facing within the
European Union an identity crisis.”55An identity that was put into question for the first time with
the arrival of the others.
It is also vital to remember that the refugee crisis added up to a series of events happened
in previous years, such as the Financial Crisis in 2008 and the Greek Debt Crisis, overwhelming
the already fragile European integration project and a sense of a common identity. These crises
can be overcome only through a profound question and analysis of the meaning of European
identity. Who are the Europeans? and what is European identity? As specified in my literature
review, there is an ambiguity and vagueness toward the meaning of European identity with no
clear answers. Nevertheless, a European identity can be considered the set of shared values with
which citizens can identify. Still, values such as democracy, respect for human rights, religious
tolerance, and solidarity, defined as “European” seem to be lost in the time of crises, with a
return to individual nationalism.
The refugee crisis has forced the EU to admit its weakness and fragilities inside the
European integration process. It seems to have threatened Europe's sense of self and its own deep
identity, with the question of who is European and who is not. The crisis brought a series of
reactions around Europe, specifically the protection of national and supranational territory and
the need to protect European people from non-European.
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The study elaborated by Jérôme Fourquet for the Fondation Jean Jaurès56 considers the
European reactions to the migrant crisis analyzing more specifically seven European countries:
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and the UK with about 1000 people
for each country. The results have shown how the majority of European public opinion agree on
the importance of assisting Mediterranean countries located in the south in order to keep people
there. Countries agreed on the support of these countries to assist properly refugees; with the
only exception of France in which the top option, 30% of the votes, was the creation of stronger
and strict borders to fight illegal immigration. Another observation that can be made is how the
majority of Europeans consider a long-term solution as the most useful and effective for the
migration problem, consequently a large part of the population sees the problem as continuing in
the future and not temporary.
In the section dedicated to the support and acceptance of migrants, we can see a picture
of Europe deeply divided. When asked about how migrants should be distributed in Europe, EU
countries do not offer a cohesive response. Germany is the number one destination for refugees,
while Italy and Greece are the main entry for refugees in Europe with a higher level of support
for accepting immigrants in their countries and distributing them equally in the other EU
countries. 86% of Germans and 69% of Italians consider their country as the one accepting more
migrants compared to other EU countries. On the other side, we have countries that are not so
favorable in accepting migrants, such as the UK with 44%, the Netherlands with 48%, and
France with 46% people in favor of welcoming refugees. This also explains why a joint
agreement among EU member states with an equal distribution of refugees in the countries has
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been particularly hard. Each member states' reactions intensely depend on the political leaders
and parties able to influence most of the population. For instance, this study was published in
2015, which is the beginning of the refugee crisis; later countries such as Italy will adopt more
nationalist measures toward the arrival of migrants with the rise of the far-right parties and,
consequently, fewer people in favor of accepting migrants. According to the study, the
publication of pictures of a Syrian boy, the so-called "Aylan effect" helped increase the support
in accepting migrants among the European population. In September 2015, the image of the dead
body of a three years old refugee, Aylan Kurdi, started to circulate in the news and newspaper,
arousing a series of strong emotions, empathy, and compassion among the public and focusing
the attention on the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Different studies have shown how a single
image was able to mobilize a series of donations and campaigns for Syrian refugees. Similarly,
this study shows how the Aylan effect was more felt in some countries than others and how there
was a shift in public opinion.
There is a division among Europeans on the acceptance of migrants in their own
countries; however, there is a common consensus on the risk that migration may represent. For
instance, 70% and 80% of participants agree that accepting a large portion of migrants may result
in many people from Africa or the Middle East moving to Europe. Another biggest fear among
citizens is represented by terrorism; 64% and 85%, respectively, in Germany and the
Netherlands, think that among the masses of refugees coming here, there are terrorists. The
majority of countries seem to agree on possible linkages between terrorists and migrants, not
only countries directly affected by terrorism in 2015, but also other countries in which terrorist
attacks did not happen. The anxiety toward terrorism remains one of the biggest worries for EU
countries, and extremist and right-wing parties have often used it to exploit feelings of fear
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among Europeans. Despite the widespread perceptions of anxiety among nations, the study also
shows how a significant part of Europeans believe in welcoming migrants. Solidarity is present
in countries that already offered a more substantial acceptance of migrants, such as Germany,
Italy, and even Spain, with less favorable people in France and the UK.
Another interesting section of the study worth mentioning is dedicated to the main idea
that migrants are, in fact, economic migrants and not asylum seekers, which national populist
parties and their supporters sustain. The same nationalists often believe or create the idea that
their own country is accepting more migrants than others. For instance, Spain and Denmark take
a deficient number of asylum seekers. However, a significant part of the population believes that
they accept more migrants than other countries in the EU. Studies similar to this one helps us
understand the divided opinions; more specifically, these deep divisions and lack of agreement
between member states are what brought to define this crisis as an existential one.
The paradox and contradiction inside the idea of a European identity is its element of
inclusiveness and exclusiveness. Europe praises itself for its cultural inclusiveness, but this has
not been the case for immigrants and non-Europeans. There is the need for multiculturalism,
acceptance of other cultures from those inside the boundaries and borders; from another side,
there is the necessity to act according to the Westphalian conception of sovereignty toward
people coming from outside the borders. Since the European identity is founded on principles of
inclusion of different cultures, the rejection and exclusion of immigrants fall into contradiction.
4.4 Borderland Europe
The question of borders, both figurately or physically, is essential when we talk about
identity, European citizenship, or Europeanness in general. The sociology behind the role and
meaning of borders is vital to understand how the other's conceptualization is produced in
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contrast to a European identity. The role of borders in Europe can help to understand better how
the European integration project was conceived and elaborated since they are the place where the
idea of Europeanness or Whiteness is elaborated, constructing a specific political space.
The Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, is the treaty that led most of the European
countries to abolish their national borders to create a Europe without borders, the so-called
Schengen Area. The Agreement is of historical importance because it ended border control
among member states. The concept of free movement among European states is very ambitious,
and it was conceived in the past, since the Middle Ages. After World War 2, the idea became
more concrete and decisive. However, the concept of free borders created concerns and doubts
among member states; there was a part supporting the idea of free Europe with no internal border
checks, but another part was strongly against it, considering it as a threat to national borders. In
May 1999, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen Agreement was included in the legal
structure of the European Union.
External and internal borders of Europe have become more and more critical with the
migration crisis in which there is a need to define what is Europe and what is not. The new
external borders are much more porous and less stable; the case of Brexit represents how
countries in the EU can be confined inside the boundary, and they can become irrelevant right
after. Author Francesca Romana Ammaturo says: “In this scenario, the abstract concept of the
'European border' becomes one of the fetishes of identity,' a fictitiously real reminder of the
importance of insulated belonging against the contaminating effect of migration and
transnational flows of individuals”57
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Borders are central in our discussion because they enable the creation of European
identity and European citizenship; they produce knowledge and information regarding Europe
and the other's conceptualization, the migrant. French philosopher Etienne Balibar uses the
expression “Borderland”58 to describe the situation in Europe, meaning a continent where
borders are displaced from their original places and placed under other rules. The author
questions the possibility of a new model of inclusion in Europe able to consider the complexities,
political and ethnic, present in the territory. He is looking for a way to eradicate exclusions,
inequalities, and differences between citizens and non-citizens. Can Europe establish a real
political integration?
Balibar discusses the meaning of European identity and the creation of European
citizenship strictly connected to territory. He proposes borders as places of integration of
individuals instead of isolation. The others do not become excluded, but they become integrated
with differences. Europe is a borderland because there are numerous borders all over the
territory; however, Europe can be transformed into an example of integration. According to him:
“Borderland is the name of the place where the opposites flow into one another, where `strangers'
can be at the same time stigmatized and indiscernible from `ourselves', where the notion of
citizenship, involving at the same time community and universality, once again confronts its
intrinsic antinomies.”59 Borders in the EU have been deprived of their central significance and
political/geographical meaning, becoming devices for constructing narratives around
Europeanness's idea.
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Balibar’s “Europe as Borderland” is fundamental to illustrate the role of borders in
Europe and the meaning of political space. The space of borders represents the relationship that
exists between an identity or citizenship and a European nation-state. The image of political
space is a potent one. The author cites another influential author, Carlo Galli, to describe the
relationship between political power and the control of borders and territorial space in general.
Reporting Galli's words, the author says how:
Globalization requires a convenient political space, which is not itself global, in order to
fully develop its dynamic potential. To put it shortly, if one wants to avoid at the same
time the reactionary reactions to globalization which try to preserve large or small
communities, and the tragic nonsense of universalized alienation ... the only possible
solution is not necessarily the dream of democratic cosmopolitanism ... . The provisory
determinations of our space and time also suggest the European alter- native, a European
space which would become a land of differences. Not in the sense of the old political
geographies, however, in which Europe was seen as the hegemonic center of the World
(the era of Jus publicum Europaeum), or [in Hegelian terms] the region where the Spirit
becomes conscious of itself, or the borderland [between the World Camps] which is like
a bleeding wound (the era of the Cold War). We are thinking, rather, of Europe
recovering after its nihilistic decline... no longer fancying to bring salvation to the World,
but `only' to build a singular political space which is not meaningless.60
As we can see, the conceptualization of political space is connected to a space of power in which
territories can create specific identities and individuals are categorized. Borders and territories
are inextricably related to power and sovereignty, in this case, European authority.
The EU has constructed a confederation of independent states without establishing
specific limits and the possibility of future expansions. The member states give up part of the
sovereignty to be subjected to some supranational identities and authorities while maintaining
strong national sovereignty. As Balibar says: “The EU is, therefore, as much permeated or
`invaded' by the World through its borders as it is `protected' or `isolated' by them from the rest
of the world.”61
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Political spaces are consequently directly correlated to European borders. The image of
political space is compelling to describe the deep connection between politics and territory,
spaces and borders. As we said many times now, borders are potent instruments in the
government's hands to oppress, exclude, and segregate people from the outside. According to
Balibar, there are different types of conflicts happening on borders and political space, such as
the clash of civilization, the global network, the center-periphery, and crossover conflicts 62. For
instance, the most evident conflict happening with the refugee crisis is represented by the clash
of civilizations, meaning more specifically, religious conflicts happening at the borders. The
Islam versus Western world/Christianity is probably the most evident conflict in which refugees'
arrival is seen as an Islamic invasion threatening Europe's own culture and religious tradition,
transforming borders into competition zones between different civilizations.
Another conflict explained by the author that can be useful for the refugee case study is
center-periphery conflict. It refers to the opposition between center and periphery elaborated by
Immanuel Wallerstein about capitalism. Borders are a division for the North and South in which
underdeveloped countries depend on developed countries. For Balibar, the center-periphery
model is constantly applied to the European identity construction with Eurocentrism. Europe is
seen as the center of the World with the concentration of powers in a single institution such as
the EU. The periphery, in this case, is represented by countries located outside Europe,
associated with the continent for economic reasons. The inclusion of these countries in the EU
can somehow impede or stop Europeanization or the creation of a European identity. Turkey's
admission to the EU is a clear example of how countries outside the center can compromise the
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European integration process, putting at risk a sort of political equilibrium inside the Union. The
same goes for the refugee crisis in which migrants coming from outside Europe are seen as a
threat to the current European cultures. There is an idea of contamination of culture, even if a
common European civilization as we know is not pure. Europe's past and history can not be
defined as pure because it contains different identities and cultures. Balibar states:
It is impossible to represent Europe's history as a story of pure identities, running the
danger of becoming progressively alienated. Its history can be represented only in terms
of constructed identities, dependent on a series of successive encounters between
`civilizations' (if one wants to keep the word), which keep taking place within the
European space, enclosing populations and cultural patterns from the whole World. Just
as it is necessary to acknowledge that in each of its `regions' Europe always remains
heterogeneous and differs from itself as much as it differs from others (including the
`new Europes' elsewhere in the World)……… In this sense, only a `federal' vision of
Europe, preserving its cultural differences and solidarities, can provide a viable historical
project for the `supranational' public sphere. 63
The author suggests how borders can have two different meanings; both local and global,
separating territories categorized as foreign, reflecting a regime of power and international order:

In another circumstance already reflecting on the example of the European space and its
role in the generalization of the institution of the `border' suggested that every border has
a double meaning, local and global: it is a `line' (more or less accepted, stable, permeable,
visible, thick or thin) separating territories which, by virtue of its drawing, become
`foreign'; and it is a `partition' or `distribution' of the world space, which reflects the
regime of meaning and power under which the World is represented as a `unity' of
different `parts'.64
To illustrate better the role of borders, the author chose the topic of the EU security
policies concerning the migrant crisis. Security policies have the precise objective of controlling
who is entering the EU or, more generally, European soil. Security is also connected to the right
of freedom of mobility inside the EU, making managing the refugee crisis particularly difficult.
Liberty of circulation is among Europeans' most valuable rights in which a constant interaction
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between different cultures can forge a common identity. However, from another point of view,
this mobility situation has created a violent and brutal exclusion of non-Europeans, identifying
the migrant as the political enemy of Europe and a threat to European culture. As we mentioned
before, borders have become the place in which different civilizations clashed and in which
differences are elaborated, questioning the understanding of a European's identity. At the same
time, if borders have become a place of exclusion, for Balibar, they can also be transformed into
integration and acceptance of cultures, creating a progressive idea of multicultural and
multiethnic Europe.
Author Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, in their essay “Border as Method, or, the
Multiplication of Labor” explain how borders have always been the place of violence and
brutality since antiquity. Humans have always needed to trace a line of demarcation between
what is considered good and evil, producing deaths of immigrants such as in the Mediterranean
or the US-Mexico borders. They often refer to the brutality of borders as “Border War” 65 since
wars and conflicts are produced at the border, pointing out how mapping and defining borders
was a colonial domination tool. This is why they refer to borders as a method used by the
government and constantly challenged by the arrival of migrants. Borders are the site of
struggles and wars to highlight the increase of deaths and accidents at sea. Security policies have
attracted and rejected migrants at the same time, creating a situation of constant instability. It
seems that immigrants are very much needed for the capitalist system of labor, but at the same
time, they are constantly kept under surveillance. As we mentioned before, borders produce the
other's concept, the foreigner who comes from outside Europe. There is the specific social
construction of the other, necessary to secure border policies. With European identity and
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European citizenship, people from different member states are not considered foreigners but
belong to the same social group. Borders then determine that whoever comes from outside this
specific delineation is a foreigner or an alien. For this reason, author Balibar describes borders as
absurd construction:
The idea of a simple definition of what constitutes a border is, by definition, absurd: to
mark out a border is precisely, to define a territory, to delimit it, and so to register the
identity of that territory, or confer one upon it. Conversely, however, to define or identify
in general is nothing other than to trace a border, to assign boundaries or borders (in
Greek, horos; in Latin, finis or terminus; in German, Grenze; in French, borne). The
theorist who attempts to define what a border is in danger of going round in circles, as the
very representation of the border is the precondition for any definition. 66

Another concept Balibar introduced is the linguistic borders which have been abused by
nation-states. Linguistic differences are another identity marker considered as the basis for
collective identities. A common language in Europe was never possible and never enforced due
to its rich diversity of languages in which translation from one language to another is celebrated.
This is one reason why there should be an inclusion of migrant languages in European society.
According to the author, Europe must eliminate some contradictions present in its construction.
The main paradox for the author is that: “They arise from the fact that the construction of this
supranational entity is taking place in a world where the territorial notions of `interior' and
`exterior' are no longer completely separable, not even in a legal manner.”67
According to Balibar: “The current difficulty, or incapacity, of Europeans (as it is expressed by
their official politics) to accept what they (confusedly) see as `non-European' (or `antiEuropean') is also a symptom of their incapacity to understand, acknowledge, and transform their
own `domestic' multiplicity.”68 This internal diversity in Europe must be celebrated and made
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productive from an economic point of view instead of portraying the arrival of diversities in
Europe as a threat to security and strangers' invasion.
4.5 Border Imperialism
The term “Border Imperialism” is borrowed from Harsha Walia's Undoing Border
Imperialism published in 2013. The South Asian author uses the term imperialism, calling
attention to the way borders are utilized and managed, emphasizing the connection between
borders and colonialism. She questions the role of borders in our contemporary world and pushes
us to rethink their primary functions. Borders are not simple delineations that separate one
country from another; they are the place where displacement, racism, and exclusion happens.
This is why it is crucial to understand the real function of borders and what they do to people. As
a matter of fact, barriers are not natural, but they are artificially constructed by men with the
specific objective of control, punish or exclude people. They are instruments of segregation,
weapons in the hands of government and, in this case, of the EU.
Walia's concept of Border Imperialism is here fundamental and can be applied to the
European Union case. She sees borders as the place of conflicts, violence, and power:
Border imperialism illuminates how colonial anxieties about identity and inclusion within
Western borders are linked to the racist justifications for imperialist missions beyond
Western borders that generate cycles of mass displacement. We are all, therefore,
simultaneously separated by and bound together by the violences of border imperialism. 69
Walia's discourse illustrates how borders and the reinforcement of borders are the product of
colonialism and the imperialist system; borders interrupt what is defined as borderless Europe.
The author perceives borders as an obstacle preventing individuals from interacting and
exchanging information and knowledge. She is calling into question the actions of government
and institutions which have reintroduced borders and enforced them.
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In the middle of the European crisis, borders have become the symbol of European
identity and the definition of what is not European or what must stay outside Europe. In addition
to that, borders are where the image of the other is processed and created. As author Ammaturo
sustains in her essay: “Albeit in different ways, the 'refugees/migrants crisis' and Brexit both
require the conceptualization of 'the other' in order to function, be it the figure of the 'migrant',
the 'terrorist', or the 'European stealing our jobs'.” 70 Every identity construction needs the other's
conceptualization to work, and during the refugee crisis, the other was identified with the refugee
and the migrant.
Her book analyzes the role of borders to discuss immigration's main issue; according to
her, there is a strong colonial logic behind borders since lands do not belong to anyone, but it is
more true that men belong to the land. The propriety or belonging of land to a specific category
of people is what the rhetoric of colonialism used to invade indigenous lands. She is committed
to fighting state-imposed borders and immigration oppression that dived the rich from the poor,
the white from black, or, in this case, the Europeans from the non-Europeans. Even if her case
study is not specifically focused on Europe, I think her conceptualization of borders can be
applied worldwide and to the European case study. In her introduction, she says how:
Border imperialism, which I propose as an alternative analytic framework, disrupts the
myth of Western benevolence toward migrants. In fact, it wholly flips the script on
borders; as journalist Dawn Paley aptly expresses it, 'Far from preventing violence, the
border is in fact the reason it occurs.' Border imperialism depicts the processes by which
the violences and precarities of displacement and migration are structurally created as
well as maintained.71
Border imperialism illustrates how identity and inclusion within western borders are connected
to racial justifications for imperialist missions. The violence of border imperialism lies in the fact
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that it is strictly related to colonialism, uniting and separating people at the same time. Walls are
a system of oppression, and the author claims a free society in which borders do not restrict
people. The author describes border imperialism as “Border imperialism is characterized by the
entrenchment and reentrenchment of controls against migrants, who are displaced as a result of
the violence of capitalism and empire, and subsequently forced into precarious labor as a result
of state illegalization and systemic social hierarchies."72 She criticizes Western imperialism's role
in displacing communities and people for capitalists and state interests, limiting the inclusion of
migrants into westerns state through a process of criminalization and racialization toward
immigrants. Western states are then accused of being mainly responsible for determining who
should migrate and under what conditions.
People have migrated from one side of the world to another since the existence of
humanity. There has always been a need to move and a desire to immigrate; however, today,
migration is more complicated, showing the inequality between the rich and the poor, the north
or the south. Western imperialism is the most significant cause for displacement and people
migration, meaning that western powers have interests in maintaining a sort of western empire,
making it possible or impossible for nonwestern communities to migrate. Despite the
humanitarian rhetoric used by western countries, countries such as the U.S and Europe have
limited their acceptance of refugees in the last few years. As Walia says: “Contrary to popular
belief about Western generosity and openness to refugees, over 80 percent of the world's
refugees reside in neighboring countries within the global South.”73 The reality shows how only
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a small minority of the refugee population worldwide is resettled in western countries, while
most are welcomed in the global South.
The topic of border control necessitates an investigation of Frontex, founded in 2004 as a
substitution for the Italian project Mare Nostrum. Frontex is the central European agency with
the task of border control, European Union's external fortification, and security inside the
Schengen area. External borders in the EU have become more fragile and inconsistent in the last
few years. Since borders are vacillating, control measures such as military aircraft have been
employed to detect migrants. As Walia says: “The European network UNITED for Intercultural
Action has documented 16,264 refugee deaths across Europe, most due to drowning at sea and
suffocation in containers. Like migrant deaths at the US-Mexico border, this number represents
the human face of border militarization policies as people are forced to seek out more clandestine
and perilous routes.”74. The Mediterranean route has been defined by numerous international
organizations as one of the most dangerous roads to cross for migrants; according to the United
Nations, at least 33,761 people have died at sea or went missing from 2000 to 201775.
Another essential process of border imperialism is, according to the author, the
criminalization of migration and the construction of migrants as illegal and aliens. Western
governments celebrate their openness and multiculturalism with the image of borderless Europe;
however, parallel to this situation, there is the constant dehumanization and criminalization of
migrants and refugees who come to Europe. Migrants, mostly undocumented or asylum seekers
arriving illegally, are punished and deported or locked up in deportation centers. They are often
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accused of crimes when in fact, they just crossed borders illegally. Borders automatically
transform migrants into criminals or prisoners, creating narratives around migration as an illegal
process. Politicians and media significantly contributed to this image of migrants as criminals or
as a threat to the state's security. The author condemns practices of incarceration and exclusion
often used by the western states to mark those considered undesirable for the country. We can
see how borders construct different stories, narratives, and concepts of identities; whoever
crossed the borders and come from the outside of Europe is automatically labeled as illegal or a
criminal.
The third construction inside border imperialism is the hierarchy of national and imperial
identity belonging to the nation-state in which the outsiders are rejected. Whiteness and white
supremacy are seen by the author as a dominating structure, deeply implicated in the concept of
European identity, being one of the reasons why migrants and refugees are excluded from the
system. It is a way to defend a system of exploitation and oppression and support a power
system.
The last structuring of border imperialism is the exploitation through media of migrant
labor for capitalist interests. Workers without legal citizenship are a distinct category of work
concerning border imperialism. Migrant workers are often forced to survive with horrible living
and working conditions supported by the state. As Walia says:
The state processes of illegalization of migrant and undocumented workers, through the
denial of full legal status that forces a condition of permanent precarity, actually legalizes
the trade in their bodies and labor by domestic capital. This strengthens the earlier
contention that the state is evolving its structures to protect neoliberal transnational
capitalism.76

76

Walia, Harsha. Undoing border imperialism. Vol. 6. Ak Press, 2013,31.

64
As we know, capitalism is trying to gain as much profit as possible from cheap labor and
mechanisms to control and oppress them. In this case, migrants are included in the nation-state
but in a limited way creating a sort of citizenship hierarchy in which they are positioned at the
bottom of society and the economy. They are often paid less than the minimum wage and can not
access essential social services: “Subjugation and exploitation are normalized against those
marked as racial outsiders, and even more against those legally labelled as foreigners.” 77
According to her, Western governments support the exploitation of migrant workers to fulfill
their capitalists' needs for cheap labor to keep in possession the nation-state's racialized national
identity. Border imperialism is creating the conditions for mass displacements and the precarity
of the migrant situation. Walls keep who is undesirable out of the nation-state, referring to a
sense of exclusive identity as the nation-state's domination. For instance, European powers
abolished borders to serve their economic interests but quickly reintroduced borders when
migrants threaten their identity and culture.
4.6 The Island of Lampedusa and Frontex
When we talk about European borders referring to the migrant crisis, the Mediterranean
Sea has become the symbol of a broken space. The Mediterranean separates Europe from the
non-European countries, and the island of Lampedusa, located in Sicily, represents the
conjunction between geography, European identity, and power. It is, in fact, one of the most
important ports in Europe and the main route for refugees trying to reach the European shores.
Lampedusa has become the symbol of the European refugee crisis and the representation of an
identity crisis. Humans crossing the Mediterranean route are automatically dehumanized,
opposed to a Europeanness concept, and represented as a threat to the European people. The
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Mediterranean borders are of fundamental importance because, from one side, they dehumanize
immigrants and refugees coming to seek asylum or protection. From the other side, they produce
knowledge on migrants, identifying them as the other, the enemy. As author Ammaturo says:

Lampedusa, Calais, Melilla, Lesvos and Idomeni not only produce the conditions for the
dehumanization of migrants and refugees, but they also create crucial forms of
knowledge about the migrants' and refugees' 'radical otherness' that find wide recognition
and acknowledgement in public discourses and end up feeding dominant narratives about
Europeanness throughout the continent. 78
Lampedusa seems to be a perfect example to illustrate the concept of border imperialism
depicted by Walia. Lampedusa has a central role in the construction of European identity and
citizenship, but it has become a place of violence and death due to the unprecedented number of
refugees crossing its border. The year 2015 is often considered among one of the deadliest years
recorded in history by IOM for migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean. According to
resources from IOM, more than 5,350 migrants died in 2015 with an increase of refugees’ arrival
almost five times more than the previous year. April is considered the deadliest month in 2015
with one of the worst tragedies that has ever happened in which a migrant boat sank at sea
provoking the death of about 800 hundred migrants. 79 Still today it is one of the most extensive
single loss of life in the Mediterranean after decades. Only 28 people were able to survive the
tragedy, and this is only the beginning of a series of tragedies that will mark the Mediterranean
as a place of death and violence. 80
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At the same time, the island is the place where specific narratives around the role of
European identity are developed, attributing negative connotations to the arrival of migrants
though a negative press coverage of the migrant crisis. It is not a surprise the fact that European
press plays a fundamental role in the refugee crisis and in the way their arrival is seen by the
public. The majority of coverage seems to lean toward a negative image of migrants seen as
outsiders and as in contrast to Europeans. 81 There is a conflictual representation of refugees
depicted as vulnerable people in need of help and often as dangerous outsiders. More
specifically, the language used by media acquire a new importance in the crisis; the use of words
such as "illegal," "invasion," "border security," "undocumented" contain strong connotations,
alarming people and bringing them to think in a specific way than another. An example of a
particular narrative created around migrants is identifying refugees with economic migrants
coming to Europe looking for better job opportunities. Defining refugees as economic migrants
can be very damaging because of refugees' international rights, giving the wrong idea to the
general public, incapable of understanding the tragedy refugees have to go through. These
narratives are usually used by far-right political parties in Europe to generate a sort of fear of the
other among citizens, creating a rhetoric of crisis able to spread all around Europe.
From these narratives produced by the media, we can construct a specific image of the migrant.
Lampedusa builds a particular representation of immigrants and migration in Europe, but it is
also a mirror for the same Europe; it reflects its image and construction. As Ammaturo says: “As
the recent vote on the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2016
demonstrates, the border (or lack thereof) acquires a new ideological significance as an essential
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tool of demarcation or proximity to the European Union.” 82 The absence of a clear line of
demarcation in Europe is one reason why a growing number of Schengen member states
reintroduced temporary border controls on several occasions back in 2015. The aim was to limit
the flow of migrants and refugees and to prevent the possibility of terrorists gaining access to the
countries. An example was Austria that reintroduced border controls similar to the pre-Schengen
control on their Italian border to prevent refugees from crossing the borders and going outside
Italy. According to the Schengen Agreement, borders can be reintroduced only to exceptional
circumstances based on the case's commission application. In 2016, borders were introduced in
various parts of Europe. Still, if some borders introduction was valid, there are also cases of
violation of the EU law, such as the Austrian control of its border with Italy. Once again, crises
seem to show the fragility of a solidary spirit, identity, and unity among member states.
In 2005, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was founded, known today as
Frontex, a collaborative project to help coordinate and manage external borders. The main goal
was ensuring the safety and well function of external borders, providing security and protection.
Frontex represents a critical factor in handling migrants and asylum seekers with increased
agency's strict security practices. The link between security and migration has become more
pressing in the last few years, and Frontex contributed to the securitization of migration through
its methods. European governments have invested a considerable amount of money in
strengthening border security, including sophisticated technologies such as aerial systems,
camera surveillance systems, computerized databases, and more. 83 New cooperations represented
an essential development for the Frontex operations, involving other actors dealing withs
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security issues such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO ships started to
conduct surveillance and monitor Turkey’s and Greece's waters, providing information to
Frontex. Frontex was also in charge of return those migrants that did not need protection and
were taking advantage of the migration crisis to enter Europe. Despite the work Frontex has
done, there are numerous limitations regarding its role. For instance, it does not have
supranational competencies, and it is strictly connected to European bureaucracy. Moreover,
back in 2015, Frontex was not powerful enough. According to author Peter Nedgar in his essay
“Borders and the EU legitimacy problem: the 2015–16 European Refugee Crisis”:
However, the problems in this regard were the following in 2015–16 (Lehne 2016a,
2016b): 1) Frontex was far from powerful enough, 2) Frontex had insufficient EU
funding, 3) the national authorities have not always been particularly cooperative
regarding Frontex, and 4) there was a fatal "soft," laissez-faire approach overshadowing
the entire EU for the entry of persons into Greece and Italy, contrary to what – according
to Schmitt – should characterize a state-like feature like the Schengen cooperation. 84
Consequently, Frontex lacked enough power to manage the refugee crisis and the border controls
properly. Author Peter Nedgar takes a very different position than the other authors, such as
Walia, advocating for rigid border control and stringent measures. He concludes his essay by
saying: “Well-functioning states require borders. Porous boundaries between countries
undermine the rule of law, security and welfare systems, as the few countries offering these
things are quickly overrun by people from countries that do not enjoy such good fortune. The
countries offering such things would therefore have to abandon them sooner or later.”85
Nevertheless, a series of reports published by Human Rights Watch shows the complicity
of Frontex in human abuses and unlawful actions. Border officers have constantly violated
international laws that require the protection of refugees arriving on European soil without
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respecting fundamental human rights. More specifically, Frontex has been accused of human
rights abuses at Greece’s borders when a media group published, on October 2020, a report
investigating the Frontex’s operations at the Aegean Sea. According to the report, migrants and
refugees were pushed back and forced to stay away from the EU waters. It is not the first time
that something like this happened; Frontex has been the center of criticism for a long time from
international organizations denouncing its human rights abuses, specifically the constant
pushbacks and return of migrant and asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey. Human Rights
Watch reports have also pointed out the use of violence against migrants and the confiscation of
their belongings. When Human Rights Watch required answers for their actions, Frontex claimed
that no abuses were ever recorded, denying the existence of what was evident. Not only Human
Rights Watch but also IOM and the UNHCR expressed their concerns over the reports
denouncing the constant expulsion of migrants from the European coasts. Despite the concrete
evidence of international laws violations reported by several international organizations, Frontex
denied that any forms of human rights abuses took place. 86
4.7 Toward a Fortress Europe?
The formation of a Fortress Europe was nearly inevitable due to the chaotic response of
the EU to the arrival of refugees. Fortress Europe is both a concrete and metaphorical term,
giving the idea of physical walls from one side and a metaphor of power and oppression of
refugees from the other, closely correlated to Europe's borders' increasing securitization.
Different metaphors have been created through the years to describe and powerfully represent
the hardening of Europe's external borders against undocumented immigrants and refugees.
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Sometimes, it is referred to as “The Wall” or “The Golden Curtain”87 to describe the limitation
imposed on certain categories of people's mobility. More recently, the fortress metaphor
originated in the Second World War context has been used to represent Europe's new security
measures to protect external borders from unwanted immigrants.
“Fortress Europe” is a compelling term used by media and politicians to represent the
rigidity of European borders in the last few years. Europe has been depicted as a fortress for
immigrants and refugees in which access to its soil has become more and more difficult.
The term is frequently used by writer and journalist Matthew Carr. Using Carr's words taken
from his article on “The Trouble with Fortress Europe”:
For more than two decades now, the European Union has been conducting the most
extensive, sophisticated and far-reaching border enforcement programme in history,
largely in an attempt to prevent 'illegal' immigration – a category that generally refers to
undocumented 'economic migrants' and refugees from poor countries and the Third
World.88
As a matter of fact, thousands and thousands of asylum seekers have been trapped in this new
system, unable to become part of Europe or any other society. Others have been confined in a
state of limbo or homelessness inside the most important European cities, in the attempt to
preserve and maintain a system in which unwanted people are excluded with the justification of a
threat of losing European identity. In addition to that, millions of euros have been spent to
reinforce border controls with border guards, police, aircraft, agencies, and other measures to
reinforce fortress Europe.
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The EU's wish to end irregular arrivals of migrants in the Mediterranean posed the basis
for a new and intense partnership with the African countries, the countries of origin for migrants
that arrive in Europe. It shows how the migration crisis is still the center of European foreign
policy and how the EU tries to give a new and coordinated dimension to European immigration
policy. In November 2015, the EU invited their African partners to the Valletta Summit to
establish a shared responsibility and strong solidarity in managing migration flows with intense
cooperation to prevent irregular migration. An example is represented by the Emergency Trust
Fund for Africa (EUTF), introduced in 2015 as a temporary emergency response for five years to
increase collaboration with African countries and sharing responsibilities for migration issues.
Cooperation with countries of origin, transit, and destination has been central to the EU policies
on migration in the past few years.
Nevertheless, the Fund has some limitations represented by the fact that is mainly
controlled by Europeans who imposed their objectives with little involvement of Africa
countries. It seems that Europeans and African countries' interests are different, if not even
conflicting. From one side, Europeans want better cooperation with African countries to return
illegal immigrants, reinforce fortress Europe, and control irregular migration in general. On the
other side, Africa countries wish to develop migration channels to the EU, a sort of
regularization of illegal migrants, and new opportunities for legal migration with the risk of
further destabilize EU migration policies. Returning illicit migrants has been on the EU's plan for
a long time; however, returning immigrants is a more sensitive issue for African countries that
are impacted too by the process of return. 89
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In his book Fortress Europe: Inside the War Against Immigration, Carr portrays the
repression of immigrants and refugees, criticizing the Common European Asylum policy. He
points out the irony behind the idea of borderless Europe, the fact that Europe celebrates its
borderless character, still it acts with the hardening of border policy which has increased human
trafficking, abuse, assaults, and organized crime. Carr also criticized the powerful and damaging
role of media and politicians toward the arrival of immigrants. The hardening of European
borders is connected to the problem of undocumented immigration, misuse of laws, and abuse of
geographical position, exposing the paradox and contradictions inside the immigration policies in
Europe and other countries. Once again, at the center of criticism and paradox, there is the
Schengen Agreement, structured to build a continent without internal borders. It is the basis for
free borders in Europe, and it came to include countries like Switzerland and Norway, which are
not part of the EU. It aims at abolishing border controls on European soil, allowing citizens to
move freely from one member state to another. The Schengen Area will operate with external
border controls imposed on international travelers from outside Europe but no internal border
controls. As authors Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse state in their conclusion to “From the
Europe to the Schengen Crises: European Integration theories, politicization, and identity
politics”: “To prevent illegal immigration, the EU has built a set of far-reaching border control
and enforcement policies. But it doesn't work: today's 'Fortress Europe' is an inefficient, immoral
and costly bureaucratic construction that should be urgently reformed.” 90 The Agreement was
meant to create a borderless Europe where borders do not matter as they used to in the past,
heading to a post-national institution able to go beyond the age of nationalism. Paradoxically,

90

Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. "From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories,
politicization, and identity politics." Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2018): 102.

73
this situation of borderless Europe has created the premises for Fortress Europe with the risk of
falling into fascism.
Greece, Italy, and the island of Lampedusa, in particular, are the center of fortress
Europe. These countries located in the Mediterranean are the most affected by the Dublin
Convention. As we mentioned before, the Dublin Convention is a fundamental part of the EU
asylum system and established how migrants should be resettled in Europe, putting most
responsibilities on migrants in the Southern part of Europe. The Dublin Convention came into
force in 1997; however, in the last few years, where the phenomenon of immigration became
urgent, changes and modifications were added to it. In substance, every asylum application
should be processed by one member state, the member state in which refugees come first. Due to
their geographical position near Africa and the Middle East, Greece and Italy are enormously
disadvantaged from the Dublin Convention. For instance, Italy has received the third highest
asylum requests in the world after the U.S and Germany in both 2016 and 2017 according to the
UNHCR. The country has received just in 2015 and 2016 a number of 153,842 and 181,436 sea
arrivals with 2,913 people missing or dead in 2015 and 4,578 in 2016.91 On the other hand,
Greece received the highest number of refugees in 2015 with 853,723 sea arrivals with a sharp
decrease in 2016 with 173,450 people, mostly due to the Turkey-EU agreement in 2016. This
situation is critical since it transforms Greece, Italy, and Spain into countries of migration for the
first time in their history, after always being considered countries of emigration in which people
flew looking for better economic opportunities outside. This may also partially justify their
incapability of dealing with the crisis in the first place.
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We said several times how European identity is represented by sharing a common set of
values with which citizens can identify. Among these values, Christianity has often been seen as
an identity marker of the European Union and a fundamental unity element. The reference to
Christianity has been abused by politicians who claim the exclusion of countries such as Turkey
from the EU, reflecting European attitudes toward the Islamic world. A perfect example citied,
already numerous, times is represented by the case of Turkey and its constant exclusion from
Fortress Europe. Politicians and statemen expressed their concern in the idea of Turkey joining
the EU, emphasizing the main difference defined by religion. Turkey is one of the most
important countries for the European Union due for its geographical position and historical
reasons. Relationship between the two are represented by cooperation from one side, and
conflicts from the other. Turkey also applied for EU membership back in 1987 and it was
rejected by the EU for democratic discrepancies present in the democratic system. As we said
before, religion often plays a more important role than it seems when it comes to exclusion of
countries from the EU. The EU architects conceived an idea of Europe based on Christianity as
the main religion and the accession of Turkey, a country whose population is entirely Muslim,
has often been seen as difficult. Europe is today largely secular where different religions
coexisting in the same continent; however there seem to be a strong Christian heritage that
represents a powerful influence. There has always been a strong opposition to Turkish accession;
for the most religious countries its accession is seen as against the idea of Europe as founded on
Christian principles; while for the most nonreligious member states it can undermine the free
lifestyle of the continent representing a possible threat to European culture and identity.
There are still conflicting views on the possible accession of Turkey in the EU and
Turkey seems to remain the perennial other in the integration and identity construction in
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Europe. We know how religion is not a valid argument for a European identity since it
encompasses different faiths under the same Union; nevertheless, Christianity has been used for
quite a long time as an instrument of unity among member states. Turkey's accession to the EU
depends on other fundamental reasons beyond religion; however, the high level of anxiety
around the idea of Turkey becoming integral part of the EU shows us how European identity is
once again more exclusive than inclusive and welcoming toward diversities.
The term Fortress Europe is also used to depict border security and police. The author
describes police brutality and guards who embody violent figures, usually making borders
challenging to access. Sometimes, they directly or indirectly support human traffickers and are
aware of the situation behind the arrival of refugees. Sometimes, they are the reason why
refugees and asylum seekers are denied access, not allowing undocumented migrants to enter
without any right to do so, abusing the law system for their benefits.
Authors Sara Marino and Simon Dawes, in their essay “Introduction to Fortress Europe:
Media, Migration and Borders”, states how the rise of global terrorism and organized crime have
been the biggest threat to the European identity, contributing to the development of a generalized
sentiment of fear shifting the debate around migration from control to security. In particular,
after 9/11, immigration has come to symbolize the dangers of terrorism and the invasion of
people coming from the outside, with a diffused feeling of instability and the fear of losing a
common type of identity and political cohesion. Most importantly, the majority of citizens see
the contamination of Europe's national identity. The feeling of a shared identity threatened, often
supported by media and newspapers, provoked the rise of populist rhetoric in public discourses
focusing on crimes, acts of violence, and illegality brought by migration, increasing social
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insecurity and anxiety among the states and their citizens. Authors Marino and Dawes describe
the use of Fortress Europe as:
First, the term refers to a global displacement crisis, with more people than ever before
fleeing conflict, violence, and violations of basic human rights, particularly from the
Middle East. Second, it calls into question the crisis of EU migration management and
the supposed failure of the European project. The chaotic and often tragic consequences
of Europe's 'managed migration' policies in Lampedusa in 2013 and more recently in
Greece and along the West Balkan route – just to name some of the case studies analyzed
by our contributors – have called into question the effectiveness of the European model
and its human and political costs. 92

The term refers to the fact that masses of people flee from their home to other countries due to
human rights violations, especially from the Middle East. Second, it refers to how Europe
manages the current crisis, exposing the fragility of the European integration project and
European identity. Thousands of lives were lost in fortress Europe, shocking the European public
opinion together with the increased number of deportation and police brutality at the borders. On
the other side, the hardening of European borders is the direct consequence of the inability to
manage immigration and a Common European Asylum policy's failure. As most authors agree,
such as Carr or Marino and Dawes, Europe's borders represent the system's failure. European
migration policies did not stop migrants from entering the EU, but they just made their journey
more dangerous with the tragic consequence that thousands of people die at sea. Secondly,
Europe was incapable of showing solidarity and unity between member states to coordinate the
way refugees can be managed and welcomed. Europe instead demonstrated to the world to be a
very divided continent with an incoherent framework. Member states were divided on how the
emergency should have been dealt with, disputing which countries should accept more migrants.
In the meantime, people were dying trying to reach European shores. Fortress Europe seems to
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have created a physical barrier and an emotional one due to Europe's sense of humanity and the
number of lives lost. The EU's inability to manage the emergency and accommodate refugees is
considered a symbol of the European identity crisis, a crisis deeply felt all around Europe.
The efforts to control migrants and enforce borders are in contrast with values of human rights,
solidarity, and inclusion that the EU has defined as the core to its political identity.
The tragic loss of refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean Sea is putting into question the
idea of inclusion and solidarity of Europe together with its humanism toward refugees. A more
humane immigration policy is necessary to transform refugees into a positive and beneficial
element for society.
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5. Conclusion
Europe has been going through a series of crises in the last decades, culminating with the
UK officially leaving the EU with Brexit in 2016. Many scholars have sustained how these
emergencies posed a threat for the EU's future with an existential identity crisis and a profound
questioning of the European integration project.
The refugee emergency in particular showed the fragility and lack of unity among
member states with the migration of such a massive number of people. The migration crisis, also
referred to as the Schengen crisis, has been characterized by the constant EU's inability to
respond in an efficient and coordinated way to the influx of refugees and migrants, which is
unprecedented in the modern history of Europe. The migration phenomenon has generated a
crisis in a series of different domains. First of all, it is a humanitarian crisis related to the
incapability of respecting the fundamental human rights of migrants who have been constantly
dehumanized as objects in national governments' hands. Secondly, it is a public health crisis for
the generation of epidemics and other diseases due to the terrible health conditions refugees are
obliged to live in refugee camps. It is also a demographic crisis since Europe faces the arrival of
vast masses of migrants and residents never seen before. We can also consider the migration
crisis as an economic and political crisis. The government struggles to manage the influx of
refugees with the direct consequence of the rise of populism and other far-right political parties.
Finally, as we extensively discussed in the chapters above, the Schengen crisis is a
security crisis due to the threat represented by crime and a threat for European identity and
culture.93 The problem of a European identity crisis and European integration project has been
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my thesis's primary focus. The EU always has exalted values of inclusiveness and celebration of
diverse cultures as the basis for a common identity in Europe and the beginning of a postnational institution able to go beyond single national member states. However, the migration
crisis has shown the fragility of an integration project with a lack of solidarity among member
states, excluding non-European populations identified as the other or the enemy entering the
European soil. The rhetoric of exclusion of migrants was abused by politicians and media who
saw the phenomenon as a threat to Western values with a decrease of support from the public
opinion to the EU integration project and the rise of Eurosceptic parties.Moreover, standard
European integration and identity theories do not explain the EU responses to the Schengen
crisis. The majority of treaties and official documents issued by the European Commission exalt
values of democracy, religious freedom, human rights protection, multiculturalism, and
multilingualism as the basis for citizens to identify with a common integration project. These
values were completely forgotten with refugees' arrival, posing the problem of who is inside
Europe and who is identified as the other, outside fortress Europe.
The crisis also shows the contradictions around the role of borders, with the Schengen
agreement promoting free borders and mobility among citizens and the rapid reintroduction of
walls with the arrival of migrants to confine them in a specific geographical area.
As Author Thomas Risse explains in his A Community of Europeans, there is a
substantial difference between citizens with Europeanized or inclusive identities and citizens
with exclusive national identities. For instance, people with exclusive nationalist identities are
more likely to be hostile toward migrants and xenophobic. We can see how the small minority of
the population more likely to identify with Europe, and a European identity will have more
tolerance and positive attitudes toward migrants.
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One of my thesis's main conclusions is that a European identity is still in the making and
is not clearly developed. Constructing common identities is a very complicated and lengthy
process. The European integration project has been in progress since the mid-'60s and became a
topic of fundamental importance in the '70s. For this reason, some scholars think it is too early to
talk about a European identity entirely and fully developed. National identities took hundreds
and hundreds of years to evolve and grow, while Europeans have been interacting with each
other for less than a hundred years inside a political entity. Another important factor is
represented by the younger population that demonstrates, according to Eurobarometer results, a
stronger attachment to the EU and Europe in general. They usually have better education, they
travel around Europe and speak more languages. The Erasmus Project, allowing them to live and
study in a different country inside the EU, may be one reason why they are more prone to have a
Europeanized identity. Consequently, in the future, there is a higher possibility that Europeans
will be more united and have a better understating of other cultures with a more vital European
spirit. For author Ana-Maria Bolborici, it is too early to refer to a common European identity;
however, Europeans will be more interested in traveling and knowing other cultures with the
evolving field of education. She cites Jurgen Habermas, a German philosopher who sustained
and promoted the idea of a European constitution, to conclude that: “the European identity will
become a reality, a reality having as pillars the solidarity focused at widespread sense of
belonging to this space, but also at the involvement based on a collective identity explicitly built,
this could occur if Europe will wants to speak with one voice at the foreign affairs level and to
pursue an active internal politics” (……) The event's history proves that the different histories
and cultures, although are living together, have a limited degree of absorption and acceptance
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from each other, terrorist attacks claimed by the Islamic organization ISIS in the last few months
being the most recent example in this regard.”94
Another main conclusion is that migration issues are strictly connected to identitarian and
cultural feelings. The Schengen crisis resulted in a collapse and disintegration of a common
asylum and migration policy. The result was an identity crisis in which the distinction between
Us vs. the Other became more urgent and pressing to define. Right-wing political parties saw the
occasion to mobilize anti-immigration sentiments among exclusive nationalists. The role of
borders in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea is of fundamental importance as the place where
the idea of Europeanness is generated. For this reason, the principal contradiction that the
refugee crisis brought is the idea of an open and multicultural Europe from one side, and a
nationalistic, exclusive, and close Europe from the other, which helped produce the concept of
Europe as a fortress.
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